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Future Agricultures Consortium. This is supported by the UK Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘Rising Powers 
and Interdependent Futures’ programme (www.risingpowers.net). We expect 24 papers to be published during 
2015, each linked to short videos presented by the lead authors. 
The CBAA team is based in Brazil (University of Brasilia, Gertulio Vargas Foundation, and Universidade Federal 
do ABC), China (China Agricultural University, Beijing), Ethiopia (Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute, Addis 
Ababa), Ghana (University of Ghana at Legon), Mozambique (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos, Maputo), 
Zimbabwe (Research and Development Trust, Harare), the UK (the Institute of Development Studies, the International 
Institute for Environment and Development and the Overseas Development Institute). 
The team includes 25 researchers coming from a range of disciplines including development studies, economics, 
international relations, political science, social anthropology and sociology, but all with a commitment to cross-
disciplinary working. Most papers are thus the result of collaborative research, involving people from different 
countries and from different backgrounds. The papers are the preliminary results of this dialogue, debate, sharing 
and learning. 
As Working Papers they are not final products, but each has been discussed in project workshops and reviewed 
by other team members. At this stage, we are keen to share the results so far in order to gain feedback, and also 
because there is massive interest in the role of Brazil and China in Africa. Much of the commentary on such 
engagements are inaccurate and misleading, or presented in broad-brush generalities. Our project aimed to get 
behind these simplistic representations and find out what was really happening on the ground, and how this is 
being shaped by wider political and policy processes.
The papers fall broadly into two groups, with many overlaps. The first is a set of papers looking at the political 
economy context in Brazil and China. We argue that historical experiences in agriculture and poverty programmes, 
combine with domestic political economy dynamics, involving different political, commercial and diplomatic interests, 
to shape development cooperation engagements in Africa. How such narratives of agriculture and development 
– about for example food security, appropriate technology, policy models and so on - travel to and from Africa is 
important in our analysis. 
The second, larger set of papers focuses on case studies of development cooperation. They take a broadly-defined 
‘ethnographic’ stance, looking at how such engagements unfold in detail, while setting this in an understanding 
of the wider political economy in the particular African settings. There are, for example, major contrasts between 
how Brazilian and Chinese engagements unfold in Ethiopia, Ghana, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, dependant on 
historical experiences with economic reform, agricultural sector restructuring, aid commitments, as well as national 
political priorities and stances. These contrasts come out strikingly when reading across the papers. 
The cases also highlight the diversity of engagements grouped under ‘development cooperation’ in agriculture. 
Some focus on state-facilitated commercial investments; others are more akin to ‘aid projects’, but often with a 
business element; some focus on building platforms for developing capacity through a range of training centres 
and programmes; while others are ‘below-the-radar’ investments in agriculture by diaspora networks in Africa. The 
blurring of boundaries is a common theme, as is the complex relationships between state and business interests 
in new configurations.
This Working Paper series is one step in our research effort and collective analysis. Work is continuing, deepening 
and extending the cases, but also drawing out comparative and synthetic insights from the rich material presented 
in this series. 
Ian Scoones, Project Coordinator, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex
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1 The ProSAVANA    
 controversy and the   
 research process
 
1.1 ProSAVANA
ProSAVANA, the Mozambique -Brazi l-Japan 
Cooperation Programme for the Agricultural 
Development of the Savannah of Mozambique, is the 
most visible of Brazil’s international agricultural 
cooperation projects. In the period since its launch in 
2010 it has become a magnet for internationally-minded 
Brazilian agribusiness interests and a rallying-point for 
their domestic opponents. It was initially framed as the 
centrepiece of the Mozambican government’s proclaimed 
strategy to promote an agrarian transformation of the 
‘Nacala Corridor’ region, which includes some of the 
country’s poorest, most populous and most politically 
contested rural areas. It has now become a key focus for 
contention between government and civil society in 
Mozambique, as well as a source of tensions between 
different parts of Mozambican civil society. The 
contestation process has led to major changes in the 
programme’s focus and approach, and consultation is 
now under way on a ‘Master Plan’ for the Nacala Corridor 
that has little in common with the version initially 
outlined by the promoters of Brazilian agribusiness 
expansion to the region. At the same time, Brazil’s 
engagement with ProSAVANA has been transformed by 
major changes in the country’s own political and 
economic context. This paper traces the pathways that 
plans for ProSAVANA and transnational mobilisations 
against the programme have followed over the course 
of the half-decade since work on the ‘Master Plan’ began. 
It examines how different visions of agricultural 
development and different practices of social mobilisation 
have interacted within Brazil and Mozambique and 
travelled between the two countries, with the aim of 
drawing lessons for future studies of the South-South 
Cooperation initiatives that are increasingly connecting 
BRICS and other rising powers with African countries.    
The initial contact that led to the establishment of 
ProSAVANA did not involve Mozambique. It was bilateral 
between Japan and Brazil,  and followed the 
announcement at the 2008 L’Aquila G8 Summit of a new 
Japanese commitment to invest in African food 
production. In September 2009 Kenzo Oshima, the Vice 
President of the Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA), Marco Farani, the Director of the Agência Brasileira 
de Cooperação (ABC, Brazilian Cooperation Agency) and 
Soares Bonhaza Nhaca, the Mozambican Agriculture 
Minister, signed the MoU that became the basis of 
ProSAVANA. The document was a materialisation of a 
convergence of interests of the Brazilian and Japanese 
governments, based on decades of Japan-Brazil 
agricultural cooperation, with the Mozambican 
government’s plans to increase agricultural production 
and productivity. The primary point of reference for 
Japan-Brazil agricultural cooperation was the Programa 
de Cooperação Nipo-Brasileira para o Desenvolvimento 
dos Cerrado (Prodecer, Japan-Brazil Cooperation 
Programme for the Development of the Cerrado), which 
in its initial form ran for two decades from 1979 and was 
instrumental both in opening up the Cerrado, the central 
Brazilian savannah belt, for soybean production and in 
establishing the Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa 
Agropecuária (Embrapa, Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation) as a world leader in tropical agricultural 
research. 
ProSAVANA consists of three components: agricultural 
research (known as ProSAVANA-PI); support for ‘model-
based’ agricultural extension (ProSAVANA-PEM); and, 
most controversially, a ‘Master Plan’ (ProSAVANA-PD) 
intended to guide significant private-sector investment 
in commercial agriculture and agro-processing in its 
target region. This trilateral agricultural development 
programme has been highly contested by both existing 
and new domestic and international alliances which 
bring together development-oriented NGOs, green 
groups and peasant movements, as well as their allies in 
academia. Its critics argue that ProSAVANA brings huge 
risks for the Mozambican peasantry and for the natural 
environment, as well as for Brazil’s credibility as a 
progressive actor in the field of South-South development 
cooperation. The increasingly vocal alliance between 
Mozambican, Brazilian and Japanese civil society groups 
opposed to ProSAVANA, amplified by the broader 
transnational networks to which these groups are 
connected, has helped to shift the dominant international 
narrative on Brazil’s involvement in African agriculture 
from respect for its politically-driven solidarity to 
accusations of commercially-driven land-grabbing.
Despite the vaulting ambition of the declarations 
about its transformative potential that surrounded its 
launch in 2010, by late 2015 ProSAVANA faced a crisis of 
credibility, with fading support from the Brazilian 
government, disagreements among its three sponsor 
countries and financial uncertainty as a result of cutbacks 
in Brazil’s development cooperation budget and of 
rapidly declining levels of private-sector investor interest, 
due at least in part to the slump in commodity prices 
seen during this period. On the ground, while progress 
had been made on the ProSAVANA-PI component 
dedicated to improving research and technology transfer 
capacity for agricultural development in the Nacala 
Corridor, a mid-term review of this component 
highlighted poor communication among the teams from 
the three partner countries (Jamal et al. 2012; Jaintilal 
2013; Cabral and Leite 2015). ProSAVANA-PEM, which 
seeks to promote the establishment of ‘agricultural 
development models’ with improvement of rural 
extension service activities at community level, has 
struggled to get off the ground (Mosca and Bruna 2015). 
Meanwhile, successive deadlines for the finalisation and 
publication of the ProSAVANA-PD Master Plan were 
missed in 2013 and 2014. A draft version of the Master 
Plan was leaked in 2013, and rapidly seized upon by social 
movements as proof that the programme had decided 
to promote a substantial component of large-scale 
commercial farming linked to foreign (presumably 
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Brazilian) investment, while the programme’s managers 
denied that any such decision had been taken. Only in 
April 2015 did dissemination and consultation begin on 
a new ‘Zero Draft’ Master Plan that was substantially 
different in emphasis from the version leaked in 2013 
(Ibid). This consultation process soon stalled, amid rising 
political tensions within Mozambique. In 2016 it was 
re-launched, along with ambitious plans for a formally-
structured mechanism for civil society participation in 
redesigning ProSAVANA. However, the programme 
remains mired in controversy, and its future has been 
called into question by a rapid deterioration in political 
and economic conditions in both Mozambique and Brazil. 
1.2 Research questions,    
 methodology and process
In this study, we set out to examine three interrelated 
questions: To what extent has Brazilian cooperation in 
the agriculture sector contributed to agrarian 
transformation in Mozambique? How has Mozambican 
civil society, and in particular the União Nacional dos 
Camponeses (UNAC, National Peasants’ Union), responded 
to the prospect of Brazilian agribusiness investments in 
the Nacala Corridor? And what effects has Brazilian-
Mozambican agricultural development cooperation had 
on the existing relations among Brazilian and Mozambican 
rural social movements, in particular UNAC and Brazil’s 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra  (MST, Landless 
Rural Workers’ Movement) and Movimento dos Pequenos 
Agricultores (MPA, Movement of Small Farmers), as well 
as between these movements and other civil society 
groups? 
Our data collection approach combined a review of 
print and audio-visual materials with key informant 
interviews conducted in Mozambique and Brazil between 
mid-2013 and mid-2016. We constructed an archive and 
timeline of the programme’s development and the 
contestation process, using government and civil society 
documents and statements to the media and in public 
meetings. We also interviewed peasants in the Nacala 
Corridor and took note of statements they made during 
ProSAVANA-related public meetings and debates in the 
media. Following our initial research in Brasília, São Paulo 
and Maputo (see Cabral et al., 2013; Chichava et al. 2013), 
in August and September 2013 we visited Nampula city 
in Nampula province; Lichinga city and Cuamba, 
Mandimba and Majune districts in Niassa province; and 
Gurué district in Zambezia province. In Lichinga and 
Maputo we attended UNAC-convened meetings where 
ProSAVANA was to be discussed, and we also participated 
in public meetings in the three countries in which 
Mozambican, Brazilian and Japanese civil society actors 
debated their response to ProSAVANA. After an initial 
synthesis phase, we carried out two brief periods of 
follow-up fieldwork in Maputo and Nampula in June and 
August 2015 to observe civil society responses to the 
consultation process on the Zero Draft Master Plan. We 
presented our findings at a seminar organised by ‘China 
and Brazil in African Agriculture’ project partner Instituto 
de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE, Institute for Social 
and Economic Research) in Maputo in December 2015, 
after which we made further revisions to the draft of this 
paper and to the World Development articles in which 
we presented some of our research findings (Cabral et 
al. 2016; Shankland and Gonçalves 2016).1  This version 
of the paper reflects a final round of revisions carried out 
in the second half of 2016, drawing on follow-up 
interviews and on discussions with our IESE and IDS 
colleagues in the editorial group of the forthcoming IESE 
book on ProSAVANA. Throughout this process we have 
remained in direct contact with key figures in Mozambican 
and Brazilian civil society, as well as accompanying media 
coverage and online debates debates on ProSAVANA. 
Over the course of the study it became clear that there 
was a significant contrast between the limited amount 
of visible ProSAVANA activity on the ground in the Nacala 
Corridor and the very significant changes in national and 
transnational political and social relations that were 
taking place as a result of the contestation over the 
programme. Our approach therefore began to focus on 
official rhetoric, anti-ProSAVANA discourses and the ways 
the programme produced a space of contestation with 
effects beyond the agrarian transformation that it intends 
to produce. Drawing on Tambiah’s (1985) performative 
approach to rituals, we decided to explore ProSAVANA 
as a construct that has gained materiality through the 
very actions of its conceptualisation and contestation. 
As Tambiah notes, in its constitutive features ritual action 
is performative in three senses: 
…in the Austinian sense of performative, wherein 
saying something is also doing something as a 
conventional act; in the quite different sense of a 
staged performance that uses multiple media by 
which the participants experience the event 
intensively; and in the sense of indexical values […] 
being attached to and inferred by actors during the 
performance. (Tambiah 1985, 128)
In our analysis, like Tambiah’s ritual action, ProSAVANA 
has produced effects that go beyond the intentions 
declared by its proponents as well as its critics. Our 
findings highlight the transformative effects of 
ProSAVANA on a particular view of agrarian development 
in Mozambique and in the relations between state and 
civil society organisations in both Mozambique and 
Brazil. Furthermore, we show that the process of 
contestation of ProSAVANA has not only activated a 
transnational network of social movements but also 
introduced new dynamics within and between civil 
society organisations in Mozambique. 
In the next section we briefly review agricultural 
policies and agrarian change in Mozambique and Brazil 
in order to highlight what historical conditions made 
possible both ProSAVANA and its contestation. We 
examine the paths taken by the different rural social 
movements that have come to contest the increasingly 
dominant role of agronegócio, which can be literally 
translated as ‘agribusiness’, but is used in the Brazilian 
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context to refer to large-scale capital-intensive 
commercial farming. Next, we turn to the analysis of the 
leaked ProSAVANA Master Plan, the related Concept Note 
and the subsequent official Zero Draft Master Plan to 
unpack the ways the programme was presented in official 
rhetoric from conceptualisation to dissemination. Then, 
we look at the strategies deployed by a transnational 
coalition of civil society organisations and social 
movements as they articulated a critique of ProSAVANA. 
Here we show the confluence of the ideological 
trajectories of Brazil’s MST and its sister organisation, MPA, 
with Mozambique’s UNAC. We end with an examination 
of the effects of ProSAVANA on the dynamics within 
Mozambican civil society organisations and the ways that 
the articulation of a transnational critique of the 
programme has influenced Brazilian and Mozambican 
approaches to South-South cooperation and agrarian 
change in Mozambique.2  
2 Agricultural policy and  
 agrarian change in Brazil  
 and Mozambique
In both Brazil and Mozambique social movements 
have sought to influence policies and the direction of 
agrarian change in order to protect the interests of 
smallholder farmers. In this section, we look at the policy 
context in these countries and the ways in which social 
movements have contributed to agrarian change. The 
aim is to highlight the agricultural policy background 
out of which ProSAVANA emerged.
2.1 Agrarian change in Brazil and the  
 origins of the exported ‘models’ 
Brazilian agricultural policy and agrarian change has 
a two-dimensional profile: the first dimension is based 
on highly mechanised large farms and the second is 
composed of smallholder agriculture. Institutionally, it 
has been characterised in recent years by the coexistence 
of two ministries for agriculture. On the one hand, the 
Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento (MAPA, 
Ministry for Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply) 
focuses on large scale development and is linked to the 
renowned agricultural research institution Embrapa. 
Embrapa, the main symbol of Brazilian agricultural 
modernisation, also plays a prominent role in the design 
and implementation of ProSAVANA as lead Brazilian 
agency for the PI component. On the other hand, until 
its abolition in 2016 the Ministério do Desenvolvimento 
Agrário (MDA, Ministry of Agrarian Development) was 
responsible for agricultural policies and programmes to 
support family farming, notably the Programa Nacional 
de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar (Pronaf, National 
Programme to Strengthen Family Agriculture), which has 
been in place for over twenty years. In addition to Pronaf, 
the main policy instrument in this sector, the MDA was 
also responsible for more recent programmes which are 
now being exported to Africa, such as the More Food 
programme.3 
In principle, family farming could complement large-
scale agricultural development, but farmers’ social 
movements and environmental organisations see them 
as two clearly distinct and conflicting approaches 
(CONTAG 2014). The large-scale approach has its origins 
in the period of dictatorship that Brazil experienced 
between 1964 and the mid-1980s. Among the drivers of 
the 1964 military coup was an attempt to stop the land 
reform that had been included in the ‘basic reforms’ 
programme presented by the deposed president, João 
Goulart. In its place the military government undertook 
an ambitious ‘conservative modernisation’ project which, 
while maintaining land concentration, was able to trigger 
a profound technological modernisation of the 
agricultural sector that, in a period of forty years, turned 
Brazil from a food production deficit country into one of 
the world’s leading agricultural exporters. This project 
of ‘conservative modernisation’ of Brazilian agriculture 
was based on three interlinked vectors (Sorj 1980). 
The first vector was the promotion of a state-sponsored 
research and technological diffusion component, which 
led to the creation of Embrapa and of an elaborate system 
of technical assistance and rural extension led by the 
Empresa Brasileira de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural 
(Embrater, the Brazilian Technical Assistance and Rural 
Extension Corporation). This also involved similar state-
level agencies in ensuring that the solutions found by 
innovative research quickly reached farmers. A generation 
of agronomists was also trained in the USA. 
The second vector was deployment of capital through 
a National System of Rural Credit to finance the transition 
from the old estates to technology-intensive agricultural 
enterprises capable of absorbing the new technologies 
generated and disseminated by the research and 
technical assistance components. In some of the most 
dynamic sectors of agricultural production, conditions 
were gradually created to integrate agricultural, industrial 
and financial capital into agribusiness ventures. Through 
this process there was a strong capitalisation of the sector, 
development of a modern business sector and the 
integration of dynamic circuits of production and 
distribution. Moreover, there was also a gradual increase 
in the production of capital goods for agriculture 
(machinery and equipment), inputs (fertilisers and 
pesticides) and services (financial and technical), forming 
part of what in the literature is referred to as the 
intersectoral agroindustrial complex.
Third, there were external conditions that favoured 
this expansion. There were fiscal and trade measures and 
a strong process of urbanisation and industrialisation 
which ensured that within one generation the rural and 
urban population shares were inverted, with three-
quarters of Brazilians living in cities by the end of the 
1980s. The whole process also allowed the integration 
into the cities of a significant proportion of the farmers 
who had lost their land to technological modernisation 
and the expansion of the agricultural frontier. 
One initiative that gave form to the ‘conservative 
m o d e r n i s a t i o n’ m o d e l  w a s  Pr o d e c e r,  t h e 
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Japanese-Brazilian Cooperation Program for the 
Development of the Cerrado. Following an agreement 
between the Brazilian and Japanese governments in 
1974, the programme’s main objectives included 
increasing the supply of agricultural products, especially 
soybeans, and stimulating the development of the 
Cerrado, the central Brazilian savannah belt that at the 
time was the country’s agricultural frontier. The 
agreement involved the creation of a holding company 
in Japan and one in Brazil, which together formed a 
company responsible for programme implementation. 
Embrapa’s role was to adapt crops to lower latitudes and 
more acidic soils, which enabled the huge expansion of 
Cerrado farming. 
The programme is now in its third phase, and its 
coverage area has reached the northern part of the 
country, with the expansion of soy growing into the 
edges of Southern and Eastern Amazonia. The main 
beneficiaries of its investments have been medium and 
large scale farmers who have gone through an intense 
process of capitalisation and technification. For this 
reason, the Cerrado is currently the region with the 
highest concentration of land ownership in Brazil, and 
labour use density rates (on average one person for every 
200ha of planted area) are lower than those for any other 
area of Brazil, except for those dominated by extensive 
livestock rearing. Much of the soy produced travels 
2,000km to the ports in the southeast and south of Brazil, 
where the beans are exported for processing overseas.
This increasing dominance of modern Brazilian 
agribusiness triggered contestation focused on the social 
and environmental costs of these models. The 1970s and 
1980s saw an explosion in the number of land conflicts. 
The Cerrado’s forest cover was practically annihilated and 
a significant number of indigenous peoples found 
themselves facing expropriation of their land. 
The Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na 
Agricultura (CONTAG, National Confederation of 
Agricultural Workers) had been created in the 1960s, but 
began to step up its mobilisation efforts in the context 
of the democratic opening of the 1980s. The Catholic 
Church’s Pastoral Land Commission, created in 1975, 
influenced a wide range of rural workers’ unions which 
participated in the creation of the Central Única dos 
Trabalhadores (CUT, Central Workers’ Confederation), 
Brazil’s most important workers’ organisation, in 1983. 
In 1985 MST was created, focusing on the occupation of 
land as a strategy for demanding the creation of agrarian 
reform settlements. At the turn of the 1990s, with the 
increasing prominence of environmental issues, several 
green organisations also began to criticize the prevailing 
dual approach in Brazilian agriculture.
Together, these organisations were responsible for 
forcing the Brazilian government to continue to develop 
policies and programmes aimed at supporting small 
farmers, even while it maintained its support to large 
scale agricultural projects. The strongest expression of 
this mobilisation came in the mid-1990s with a movement 
called Grito da Terra Brasil (Cry of the Land Brazil), which 
demanded the creation of a specific programme for 
family farming, later established as the Pronaf. Taking 
advantage of a moment of crisis within the sector, 
coupled with state funding difficulties, these 
organisations skilfully built an alliance with sectors of 
the government bureaucracy, academia and donor 
agencies to formulate a proposal for segmentation of 
Brazilian agriculture and support for family farming in 
particular. The argument was that a significant part of 
this segment was about to enter or had already entered 
modern productive circuits, and thus had gained 
legitimacy to access public funds in the same way as the 
large-scale sector. 
In the 2000s, during the first term of President Luís 
Inácio Lula da Silva, the internationalisation of Brazilian 
agribusiness began. On the one hand, a new foreign 
policy started to take shape, with greater emphasis on 
South-South cooperation, and engagement with Africa 
was made a priority. On the other hand, agri-food sector 
businesses became a key part of the coalition supporting 
the government led by Lula’s Partido dos Trabalhadores 
(PT, Workers’ Party). In a decade the Brazilian economy 
went through a process of ‘re-primarisation’, with the 
primary sector quadrupling its share of GDP. Today over 
80 percent of Brazilian exports are either primary or 
processed primary products.
In this context, Africa began to be thought of as a 
possible destination to which ‘Brazilian style’ 
modernisation could be exported. African savannahs 
began to be seen as a new agricultural frontier in the 
face of pressure for conservation of the Amazon biome. 
This was reinforced by the perceived similarities in the 
comparative advantages of the African continent today 
and the Brazil of a generation ago. Africa’s greater 
proximity to Asia, a major consumer market, its lower 
cost of the factors of production (land and labour) and 
its lighter legal restrictions (that is, looser environmental 
and labour regulations) were also identified as attractions. 
All these factors together were seen as presenting a huge 
opportunity to export a technology-based business 
model, along with the expansion of Brazil’s political and 
economic influence. 
What was not in the script of this export plan was that, 
given that conflict was an integral part of the Brazilian 
model, it would also be present on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Just as in Brazil, this would lead to the narrative 
of complementarity being deployed in Africa in 
counterpoint to the narrative of conflict between two 
social forms of production in agriculture.
 
2.2 Mozambique: a history of   
 extroverted agricultural policy 
Since independence in 1975, successive governments 
led by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo, 
the Mozambique Liberation Front), have declared that 
agriculture would be the basis for the country’s 
development. In the years that followed independence, 
the view was that large state farms combined with 
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peasants’ collective production organised in cooperatives 
would provide the necessary impetus for subsequent 
industrial development (Mosca 2008; Castel-Branco 
1994). This double strategy required that part of the 
peasantry would be transformed into proletarians 
working on state farms while others settled in communal 
villages where they would engage in collective 
production and benefit from state provision of social 
services (Borges Coelho 1998; Araújo 1988).
Internal and external factors contributed to the 
collapse of this agricultural development plan. Among 
the internal factors, economist João Mosca points to the 
replacement of a market logic with one based on 
planning, excessive centralisation and the gulf between 
what centralised planning was able to offer and peasants’ 
expectations (Mosca 2008). These factors were 
exacerbated by a civil war that quickly expanded to most 
of the country’s rural areas within the first decade after 
independence. Externally, political and economic 
instability in Southern Africa and changing global 
geopolitics undermined the financial support Frelimo 
had expected from the socialist bloc, contributing to the 
downfall of the state farms and cooperatives project.
Under the political and economic reforms that came 
with the adoption of the Structural Adjustment Plan in 
1987, a process of privatisation of state farms began. 
Peasants received portions of land and were eligible to 
buy state farms (Pitcher 2008). However, in the context 
of the civil war this was seen as furthering the 
government’s military strategy to co-opt and control the 
part of the peasantry that supported the Resistência 
Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo, Mozambique National 
Resistance), rather than as an effective process of agrarian 
change (Pereira 1996; Roesch 1992; Geffray 1991).
From the mid-1990s Mozambique began to draw up 
sector-specific policies for agriculture, but for a mix of 
structural and institutional reasons no sustained progress 
has been achieved in incorporating smallholder farmers 
into the agrarian change process. In 1995, the Política 
Agrária e Estratégia de Implementação (PAEI, Agrarian 
Policy and Implementation Strategy) was conceived as 
a means of articulating activities in the agricultural sector 
of a country under post-war reconstruction. As such, its 
objectives of increasing production and productivity and 
conducting institutional reforms were broadly defined. 
Four years later, in 1999, the Programa Nacional de 
Desenvolvimento Agrário (PROAGRI, National Programme 
of Agrarian Development) was adopted, followed by a 
second phase initiated in 2006. In addition, between 1987 
and 2014 Mozambique produced four Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, a Green Revolution Strategy, a Rural 
Development Strategy, an Action Plan for Food 
Production and a National Development Strategy. All 
these documents have provided inputs to the agricultural 
sector, but the weak articulation between different policy 
documents has not supported the implementation of 
significant sustained projects. 
Research on both phases of PROAGRI has concluded 
that the programme largely neglected smallholder 
agriculture. For example, Cabral et al. (2007: 7) note that 
PROAGRI I ‘focused too much on building (planning and 
financial management) systems and capacity in the 
ministry and much less on ensuring that this improved 
capacity actually generated more effective service 
delivery at the field level’. Cunguara and Garrett (2011: 
19) add that it ‘focused only on production while 
commercialisation, credit and rural infrastructure 
received little consideration’. The same authors note that 
during PROAGRI II, ‘access to agricultural services (for 
example, access to rural extension work and prices of 
agricultural products), use of technology and agricultural 
productivity decreased’ (Ibid). In 2011 the Ministry of 
Agriculture launched the Plano Estratégico de 
Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário (PEDSA, Agrarian 
Sector Strategic Development Plan), a policy document 
that brings together the objectives espoused by all its 
predecessors. However, operationalising PEDSA has 
required the development of further specific guiding 
documents, such as the Plano Nacional de Investimento 
do Sector Agrário (PNISA, National Agriculture and Food 
Security Investment Plan) adopted in 2013. 
When put into historical perspective, agricultural 
policy in Mozambique is still a long way from leading 
agrarian change and fulfilling the promise of 
development. As Cabral et al. (2012: 17) note, ‘when it 
comes to agriculture, Mozambique’s story is largely one 
of unfulfilled promises, uneven performance and 
untapped potential’. Cunguara et al. (2011: 3) also note 
that ‘genuine economic transformation is stagnant, since 
the agricultural sector is still waiting for more investments 
and higher quality in the markets and technologies for 
small farmers, the removal of constraints imposed by 
financial and land markets, a more efficient public sector 
and the emergence of a more dynamic private sector’.
While the government has been tinkering with 
agricultural policy, civil society organisations have 
focused their efforts on ensuring that neoliberal policies 
do not lead to the expropriation of land in a country 
where more than 80 percent of the population practices 
agriculture. When in mid-1995 the government 
established an inter-ministerial Land Commission to draft 
the new Land Law, civil society organisations engaged 
effectively in a policy dialogue that resulted in the passing 
of a Land Law according to which individual titling is not 
the only legal form of access to land. This law recognises 
occupation rights and that proof of rights in land can be 
provided by oral testimony. However, the implementation 
of the law has not been without issues.
Recent years have seen the escalation of civil society 
contestation of existing and planned investments in 
agribusiness. The promised benefits for rural dwellers 
and smallholder farmers have been denounced as 
strategies to trick local communities and facilitate the 
expropriation of land (for documented examples see 
Hanlon 2011; 2002; Åkesson et al. 2009). Other rural 
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development activities and the exploitation of natural 
resources have also put pressure on land, particularly 
where development projects have led to population 
resettlements. Issues related to soil impoverishment and 
its implications for smallholder farming have been raised 
throughout the country (e.g. Deininger and Byerlee 2011; 
Mosca and Selemane 2011).
In the last few years, the Mozambican ruling elite has 
increasingly been advocating for technology- and 
capital-intensive agribusiness as the best approach to 
the promotion of a dynamic rural sector. This has 
increased the symbolic and practical attraction of Brazil’s 
experience. Mozambique has sought to obtain the 
necessary capital and technology from any source willing 
to provide it, from North or South. South African, 
European and Malaysian investors have responded to 
the opportunities signalled by the Mozambican 
government, and Chinese investors have become active 
in other ‘development corridors’ in the south and centre 
of Mozambique, especially irrigation zones such as the 
Lower Limpopo (Chichava et al. 2013). However, Brazil’s 
role as a development partner has become increasingly 
visible in recent years.
2.3 Brazil in Mozambique
The Brazilian presence in Mozambique has increased 
significantly in the last decade, but in itself it is by no 
means a new phenomenon (Rossi 2015). Links between 
the two countries began while both were under 
Portuguese colonial rule, as the ‘South Atlantic System’ 
of slave trading extended into an incipient process of 
the ‘Atlanticization of Mozambique’ (Alencastro 2007: 
147). By the 1830s trade was accompanied by intense 
cultural and political exchanges, especially between Rio 
de Janeiro, now the capital of an independent ‘Brazilian 
Empire’, and the northern Mozambican port city of 
Quelimane (Caldwell de Farias 2014). With the ending of 
the slave trade the intensity of exchange declined, but 
links were kept alive into the second half of the twentieth 
century by a tradition of ‘Africanism’ within Brazil’s 
diplomatic corps (D’Avila 2010). In the 1960s and early 
1970s a number of exiles fleeing Brazil’s military 
dictatorship took refuge in Mozambique (Massena 2009). 
They were joined by increasing numbers of Brazilian 
cooperantes, development cooperation workers, after 
Mozambique secured its independence from Portugal 
in 1975 (Azevedo 2012). 
In the 1980s a large agricultural development 
programme supported by the African Development Bank 
saw over 40 Brazilian agronomists and other technicians 
working with Mozambican counterparts in the Lioma 
State Farm in Gurué District of Zambézia Province, which 
is now part of the area covered by ProSAVANA (Shankland 
forthcoming). However, the project was abandoned after 
an intensification of Renamo attacks in the region, and 
none of the Brazilian officials with whom we spoke had 
any knowledge of this prior phase of agricultural 
development cooperation.
The 1990s and early 2000s saw Brazil-Mozambique 
exchanges of another kind, as Mozambican peasant 
leaders made visits to Brazil that were sponsored by 
Northern NGOs, including as part of the movement of 
international solidarity that followed the murder of 19 
protesters belonging to MST by state police near Eldorado 
dos Carajás in the Eastern Amazon in 1996. This brought 
UNAC into contact with MST, a contact that was 
subsequently to be intensified through UNAC’s growing 
involvement with the transnational agrarian movement 
(TAM) Vía Campesina, described by Borras Jr et al. as 
‘perhaps the most politically coherent of all contemporary 
TAMs’ (2008: 172). There was thus a prior history of rural 
social movement interactions that could be drawn upon 
to mobilise transnational contestation of the next wave 
of engagement by Brazilian corporations and government 
agencies.
Brazilian private-sector investment in Mozambique, 
much of it state-backed through loans from the giant 
Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(BNDES, National Economic and Social Development 
Bank), expanded exponentially during the Lula 
government (Rossi 2015). It was accompanied by a boom 
in Brazil-Mozambique development cooperation 
projects, both triangular (with Japanese, US or UK 
support) and South-South. Along with health and 
education, agriculture was to emerge as one of the 
leading sectors for such cooperation projects (Leite et 
al. 2014). While Embrapa was the dominant player, 
university-based agricultural researchers and technical 
specialists from the MDA also began to develop projects 
with Mozambique, especially after the 2010 Brazil-Africa 
Forum (Cabral et al. 2013). 
The government officials and movement leaders were 
soon joined by two other groups of Brazilians who were 
to become an increasingly significant part of the 
ProSAVANA story: development NGO activists and 
agribusiness consultants. In addition to funding from 
international NGOs, the former were able to leverage 
government support for a farmer-to-farmer exchange 
between Brazilian peasant organisations and UNAC 
(Poskitt and Shankland 2014). The latter had developed 
a close working relationship with the big corporate 
players in mining, logistics and construction who were 
moving into Africa, but as the idea for ProSAVANA 
germinated they were also able to position themselves 
as potential implementers of government agricultural 
development cooperation projects.
Although Brazilian corporations and agencies’ 
engagements with Mozambique span a wide range of 
scales, locales and sectors, from television advertising 
to civil engineering to public health policy, there is one 
which has stood out as by far the most significant actor 
in this latest wave: the mining and logistics giant Vale, 
which began exploring opportunities in Mozambique 
in the late 1980s and became the country’s single largest 
foreign investor after winning control of the massive 
Moatize coal deposits in Tete Province in 2004 (Rossi 
2015). Vale has long operated a ‘corridor development’ 
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model in Brazil that brings together mineral extraction 
and logistics – including railways and port complexes 
– with agribusiness development, maximising the returns 
on its logistics investments but often also intensifying 
land conflicts in the corridor regions (Selemane 2010; 
Almeida 1994). A Brazilian agribusiness consultant 
working on ProSAVANA told us that in his experience in 
Brazil, ‘Vale builds the railways to get the minerals out, 
but then comes to people like us to help generate cargo 
for them’. 4 
In 2010 Vale took a controlling stake in the rail operator 
responsible for the line running across northern 
Mozambique to the port of Nacala, as well as in its 
Malawian counterpart (which made it possible to link 
the Moatize mine to the port more directly by cutting 
across Malawian territory). It thus managed to position 
itself to play a central role in agricultural development 
in this strategic ‘Nacala Corridor’, bringing the experience 
of its integrated Brazilian model into dialogue – and 
potentially into tension – with the spatial planning logic 
followed by the Mozambican state when it designated 
Nacala as one of the six strategic ‘development corridors’ 
of the national agricultural development framework.
Vale has brought with it to Mozambique an ecosystem 
of suppliers and satellites that includes not only the 
construction firms working on the Corridor’s transport 
infrastructure but also the agribusiness consultants with 
whom it is used to working in Brazil. The latter include 
GV Agro, which led the development of the ProSAVANA 
Master Plan component, and which carried out a study 
for Vale of the potential for bioethanol development in 
Mozambique that served in many ways as the Master 
Plan’s blueprint. This ecosystem extends into the state 
as well: the CEO of Vale appears in a 2010 Brazilian 
government video claiming that his firm had ‘taken 
Embrapa to Mozambique’ (Planalto 2010), and indeed 
Embrapa first began to carry out studies for Vale in the 
country as far back as 2005. This was the period in which 
Embrapa was subordinated to the then Minister of 
Agriculture Roberto Rodrigues, who is now head of GV 
Agro. This web of state-corporate-political interests has 
played a central role in driving ProSAVANA, and given 
the financial, political and technical power it can deploy, 
it could reasonably be expected to have an impact on 
agriculture in the Nacala Corridor region that is nothing 
short of transformational.
2.4 A Brazil-driven    
 agrarian transformation   
 in Northern Mozambique?
Our initial document review and media scan suggested 
that Brazilian agribusiness interests were indeed already 
actively investing in the region targeted by ProSAVANA, 
and the programme’s documentation implied that a 
major effort was under way to transfer Brazilian tropical 
agricultural know-how through the research component 
of the programme (known as ProSAVANA-PI) even before 
the Master Plan had taken shape. However, our fieldwork 
found that thus far the impact in the Nacala Corridor 
region of both Brazilian agribusiness investment and 
Embrapa-supported technology transfer remains 
negligible. 
This is despite all the undoubted efforts of the web of 
interests centred on Vale and Roberto Rodrigues. This 
web of interests promoted several visits by potential 
Brazilian investors, including both large and relatively 
small-scale agribusiness operators, but these have 
produced very few concrete results. There is certainly a 
Brazilian presence in agriculture in the Nacala Corridor, 
mainly via a few agribusiness firms’ joint ventures with 
companies controlled by the Frelimo elite, but there is 
no large-scale Brazilian land grab under way. 5 Even where 
we identified sites for which Brazilian investors had 
secured land use permits (known in Mozambique as 
Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento de Terra, or DUATs), these 
seemed purely speculative: no effort had been made to 
start the investments required by the terms of the DUATs, 
and as a result these looked set to lapse before ProSAVANA 
had even concluded its Master Planning stage. Most of 
the DUAT requests that we identified dated to the initial 
wave of enthusiasm around the announcement of 
ProSAVANA in 2011-2012, and this wave had clearly been 
on the ebb for some time.
Some of our interviewees suggested that Brazilian 
interest in acquiring land in northern Mozambique would 
continue whatever happened with ProSAVANA – one 
used the phrase ‘wherever the soybean grows, the 
gaucho will try to plant it’.6 However, the scale of a 
possible second wave of Brazilian interest in acquiring 
land in the Nacala Corridor will depend on developments 
in Brazil, in Mozambique and in the key Asian markets 
for soybeans and other crops where Brazilian producers 
have a strong track record. 
In Brazil, the agricultural frontier is still expanding, both 
into the Amazon and into the drier parts of the Cerrado 
belt in the northeast. Only if national policy shifts in ways 
that increase the costs of expansion into these areas by 
strengthening the regulations protecting biodiversity 
and indigenous territories in these regions of Brazil will 
the relative attractiveness of acquiring land in Africa 
increase. However, this has become less rather than more 
likely as a result of the political crisis that has convulsed 
Brazil since the October 2014 general election. This saw 
President Dilma Rousseff from Lula’s Workers’ Party (PT) 
narrowly winning re-election, but also increased the 
presence in Congress of representatives sympathetic to 
the agribusiness lobby, who were able to hold hostage 
her weakened government. As President Rousseff fought 
to keep control of Congress in the face of economic crisis 
and corruption scandals, she made a series of concessions 
to this lobby, including the appointment of a key 
agribusiness spokesperson as Agriculture Minister. These 
concessions proved insufficient to win lasting support, 
and key figures from the agribusiness lobby were active 
in the process that led to her impeachment by Congress 
in August 2016. The interim government of former Vice-
President Michel Temer enjoys strong support from 
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agribusiness interests, which it has repaid not only by 
abolishing the MDA (thereby removing the principal 
centre of pro-peasant policymaking) but also by reversing 
some of the measures to protect biodiversity and 
indigenous land rights that had been put in place under 
the Workers’ Party governments (Shankland et al. 2016). 
In Mozambique, the extent to which the government 
was prepared to face down campaigning by UNAC and 
others and ensure large land grants for the exclusive use 
of foreign farmers was initially called into question when 
the hard-line President Armando Emílio Guebuza was 
replaced by the more conciliatory Filipe Jacinto Nyusi in 
early 2015. Nyusi attempted to build bridges with civil 
society, but this effort was derailed by hardliners within 
the governing Frelimo party, who carried out a series of 
assassinations and other attacks on leading civil society 
figures and opposition politicians that soon led to a 
climate of fear replacing the initial optimism. This has 
been seen as an attempt to close down space for political 
debate in the face of a resurgent Renamo, whose leader 
Afonso Dhlakama ran Nyusi unexpectedly close in the 
2014 Presidential Elections. Dhlakama has claimed that 
the fact that Renamo won the largest share of the vote 
in several key provinces – including Nampula and 
Zambézia, the most populous of the provinces covered 
by ProSAVANA – gives him the right to establish 
‘autonomous provincial governments’ there, and has 
threatened to pursue this decentralisation by force if 
necessary. Armed confrontations between Renamo 
fighters and government forces have occurred in several 
districts within ProSAVANA’s target area. In these 
circumstances, Frelimo has little interest in provoking a 
revolt among the peasants of the Nacala Corridor by 
supporting large-scale land-grabs. 
There has nevertheless been an increase in the number 
of reports of land-grabbing in the Nacala Corridor region, 
and one such case does involve a large soybean farm in 
Zambézia that is part-owned by the Brazilian agribusiness 
firm Grupo Pinesso (UNAC and GRAIN 2015). However, 
this farm was established through a joint venture with 
the family of former President Guebuza, without any 
support from ProSAVANA. Some of the land conflicts in 
the Corridor have become associated with ProSAVANA 
because they have received funding from a JICA ‘Quick 
Impact Fund’ that was branded as a ‘ProSAVANA’ activity; 
however, this fund was established separately from the 
joint Japan-Brazil-Mozambique ProSAVANA programme, 
and none of the projects that it has funded involve 
Brazilian investors (Mosca and Bruna 2015). 
The scale of future Brazilian agricultural investment 
in the Nacala Corridor will depend both on the speed 
with which Vale and its partners put in place the transport 
infrastructure that is needed to get produce from the 
Corridor to Asian markets affordably, and above all on 
the long-term price outlook for soybeans and other 
potential export crops. Vale has overcome initial fears 
that its infrastructure development programme would 
be radically scaled back in the face of collapsing coal 
prices, thanks to a cash infusion from the Japanese 
conglomerate Mitsui, whose business case for investing 
in the Nacala Corridor rail and port complex seems to 
assume that it will soon be shipping up to four million 
tons per year of agricultural commodities (Mitsui & Co. 
2014). This may, however, be wildly over-optimistic given 
current volatility and a depressed outlook for soybean 
prices at least in the medium term.
Most of the investment currently going into soybean 
production in the Nacala Corridor is intended to supply 
the market for chicken feed within the region, which is 
growing rapidly (Smart and Hanlon 2014). However, 
Brazilian soy growers are not interested in producing for 
the local Mozambican market, nor are they used to 
operating via contract farming with peasant producers; 
they excel at export-oriented production on their own 
large farms. This did not prevent contract farming 
opportunities and investment in local markets from 
assuming ever-greater importance at the heart of the 
ProSAVANA team’s efforts to persuade UNAC and others 
that the programme would benefit small-scale 
Mozambican farmers as well as welcoming larger-scale 
foreign investments, in a clear example of the 
‘complementarity’ narrative already seen in Brazil. 
As we discuss below, the Zero Draft Master Plan finally 
released in April 2015 not only uses the ‘complementarity’ 
discourse but avoids as much as possible any suggestion 
that ProSAVANA will have a large-farm component at all. 
However, examination of the way in which the 
programme’s coverage area has been redefined since 
2010 suggests that it is intending to retain an element 
of large-farm development – just not in the original 
‘Corridor’ along the rail line, whose relatively high 
population density makes conflict with large farms 
inevitable. Successive maps produced by the ProSAVANA 
Master Plan team have expanded its area to incorporate 
additional regions of Niassa Province that are further and 
further away from the rail line (the ostensible rationale 
for the Corridor), but have been identified as having low 
population densities and agroecological conditions that 
may be suitable for soybean cultivation using the large-
farm Cerrado model. As the sequence of maps in Figures 
1-4 below shows, through this process of northwards 
expansion the region covered by ProSAVANA grew from 
an initial 12 districts in 2010 to 19 districts in 2015.
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Figure 2: ProSAVANA’s planned implementation area, 2012
Source: Bias 2012
Figure 1: ProSAVANA’s planned implementation area, 2010
Source: Oriental Consultants (2010) 
Working Paper 137 www.future-agricultures.org15
Figure 3: ProSAVANA’s planned implementation area, 2013
Source: ProSAVANA-PD 2013b
Figure 4: ProSAVANA’s Area of Implementation, 2015
Source: MASA (2015)
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By adopting this strategy of northward expansion, 
ProSAVANA seems to be trying to avoid making the hard 
choice between frustrating the expectations of Brazilian 
and other agribusiness investors and confirming the fears 
of the Mozambican peasantry, by implying that would-be 
investors can be directed towards remoter and less 
densely-settled areas in the northern part of the Nacala 
Corridor. However, these areas are far from ‘empty’, and 
many lie in the buffer zone of the Niassa Reserve, 
Mozambique’ largest protected area. Some land and 
environmental conflicts therefore seem inevitable even 
if this push succeeds – which it may not, given the greater 
attraction to investors of the more easily-accessible (and 
more densely-settled) land that lies along the region’s 
rail and road corridors.
In our fieldwork we found that the current Brazilian 
presence in the Nacala Corridor is associated with some 
technology transfer, but this takes place less through the 
official presence of Brazil’s flagship agricultural research 
institution Embrapa, the lead agency for the research 
component of ProSAVANA, and more through individual 
Brazilian agronomists who have found work with 
agribusiness operations in the Nacala Corridor that are 
owned by South African or European investors. We even 
found that while soybeans had indeed been introduced 
by the Brazilians, this did not happen under ProSAVANA; 
in fact, soy-growing in the Nacala Corridor was pioneered 
in the 1980s by the large Brazilian-led agricultural 
development project centred on the Lioma State Farm. 
After the project was abandoned during the war it was 
forgotten by Brazil’s own development agencies – though 
not by the Mozambican peasants who had worked with 
Brazilian technicians to introduce and adapt tropicalised 
soy varieties three decades ago (Shankland forthcoming).
In general, there are also very few current signs in the 
Nacala Corridor of any agrarian transformation at all, 
whether driven by Brazilian capital and technology or 
not, though this may change in the medium term, if we 
believe the ambitious plans outlined in a new Japan-
Mozambique regional development programme, the 
Projecto das Estratégias de Desenvolvimento Económico 
do Corredor de Nacala (PEDEC, Project for Economic 
Development Strategies in the Nacala Corridor). For now, 
despite some foreign investment and a rapid growth in 
commercial soybean production by medium-scale 
‘emergent farmers’ in a few areas where conditions are 
particularly favourable, the transformation envisaged by 
first ProSAVANA and now PEDEC has barely touched the 
lives of most of The Nacala Corridor’s small-scale farmers. 
In the most optimistic recent study, Smart and Hanlon 
(2014) conclude that there may be more than 60,000 
‘emergent farmers’ in Mozambique – but even this 
number is a tiny fraction of the country’s two million or 
so rural households, and there is no sign that the enabling 
conditions these authors identify as needed to permit 
the kind of scaling-up required to turn this into a full-scale 
agrarian transformation are going to be in place any time 
soon. The mass of Mozambique’s farmers, for whom 
UNAC claims to speak, thus remain on the margins both 
of Brazilian engagement and of broader moves towards 
an agrarian transformation in the country. 
ProSAVANA is thus clearly not promoting a Brazil-
driven agrarian transformation in the Nacala Corridor 
region. However, this is not to say that ProSAVANA is not 
producing wide-ranging effects within Mozambique, in 
Brazil and beyond. What we found is that these impacts 
are above all political in nature, and they are produced 
through the discursive framing and contestation of the 
programme rather than through its presence on the 
ground.
3 Official discourse: from a  
 leaked Master Plan to the  
 Zero Draft 
Official rhetoric on ProSAVANA has shifted over time, 
in part as a response to the contestation process but also 
as a result of changing economic and political conditions 
at the global level and particularly in Mozambique and 
Brazil. In this section we examine how this rhetoric has 
been articulated at different points during the 
development of the Master Plan, which as noted above 
suffered repeated delays and was only finally released 
in Zero Draft form in April 2015.  
3.1 The leaked  Master Plan
In April 2013, a draft version of ProSAVANA’s master 
plan was leaked to the website farmlandgrab.org, 
prompting a vehement reaction from civil society 
organisations to the private investment-driven 
agribusiness model that it envisaged, and especially to 
its inclusion of large-scale commercial farming within 
some of the ‘zones’ into which it divided the Corridor, 
three of which would be designated primarily for soybean 
production. The document envisaged a fifteen-year, 
three-phase programme whose initial phase would 
emphasise the ‘fixing in place’ of smallholder agriculture, 
which in the Nacala Corridor overwhelmingly follows an 
itinerant slash-and-burn/fallow pattern of shifting 
cultivation. While this was justified as establishing a more 
solid foundation for agricultural intensification on 
peasant farms, it would also have the convenient side-
effect of freeing up current fallow areas for allocation to 
commercial investors by reclassifying them as 
‘unoccupied’. 
Overall, the underlying rationale of the leaked Master 
Plan clearly attempted to combine three separate 
approaches familiar from the literature on rural 
development. The first approach was that of export-
oriented agriculture. The very notion of a ‘corridor’ 
symbolises a vision in which the structural axis is a flow 
of local products to dynamic external markets whose 
demand encourages farmers to change their practices 
to increase productivity and receive higher returns. It 
was expected that contract farming arrangements would 
ensure the stability and activation of circuits of technology 
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investment, technical assistance and access to markets, 
connecting producers to end consumers via agro-
industrial investments in the corridor. The second 
approach, integrated rural development, has been 
applied with mixed results over decades by many 
international development cooperation projects in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa. Here the view is to address a 
wide range of constraints experienced by rural 
populations – from the forms of production to issues 
such as health and gender relations. The third approach 
is to favour family farming, emphasising its modes of 
production and consumption and ensuring family 
farmers’ autonomy in decision-making on the use of 
resources. 
These three visions coexisted in the document, 
suggesting that it was attempting to deploy a discourse 
of complementarity – an indication that the Mozambican 
government was not indifferent to criticism and that it 
recognised the limitations of each of the three models 
when applied in isolation. However, an implementation 
strategy that effectively ensured harmonisation of the 
three approaches would require very specific skills and 
abilities, high-quality human, technical and financial 
resources and a great capacity for coordination between 
the various components and their inevitable conflicts. 
The Brazilian experience shows that it is difficult to 
achieve the kind of harmonisation projected in the leaked 
version of the Master Plan. Large-scale projects like 
Prodecer and Proálcool, (the sugarcane-based bioethanol 
development programme launched in the 1970s) had 
among their declared objectives giving priority to family 
farming. However, the dynamics of agri-food chains and 
their requirements in terms of productive competitiveness 
swiftly created enormous levels of differentiation among 
farmers. In addition, the transformation in the social fabric 
in the crop-producing regions resulted in an inevitable 
process of monetisation of social relations which had 
structural effects on traditional ways of life. The end result 
was that while these regions grew richer a process of 
differentiation among farmers became entrenched, with 
a smaller group included in production and marketing 
channels;  another small  group employed in 
manufacturing industries, services and commerce 
created to support the agro-industrial sector (the concept 
of ‘clusters’ underpinning the leaked Master Plan); and a 
majority group having to seek livelihood alternatives in 
other sectors, often in distant urban centres. In terms of 
economic and social indicators the result was a decrease 
in overall income poverty, combined with an extreme 
increase in inequality and vulnerability and a strong 
intensification of rural-urban migration.
With regard to its beneficiaries, the leaked version of 
the Master Plan proposed a double differentiation. On 
the one hand, producers were organised according to 
scale, from small to medium to large. On the other, small 
farmers were subdivided into three groups: ‘vulnerable’, 
‘typical’ and ‘emergent’. Different strategies are proposed 
for the various groups, in line with the rationale outlined 
above. Although this was not formally articulated, a 
prominent role was allocated to the ‘emergent’ farmers, 
as they were identified as having the resources and skills 
required to access new technologies and innovations 
and adapt to the requirements of contract farming with 
processing and marketing companies. According to the 
document, it was expected that these farmers would 
serve as reference-points (or models) for the ‘typical’ 
group of farmers, encouraging the latter to move into 
new forms of production and market integration.
It was also expected that knowledge, skills and 
resources to be provided by the public sector would 
improve the livelihoods of the vulnerable. However, 
implementing this strategy is not a simple ‘cultural’ issue 
to be resolved by exposing the poorest and most 
marginalised members of the peasantry to successful 
examples of emergent farmers. Nor is it a question of 
supply, to be resolved with improved agricultural 
extension and the introduction of new techniques. It is 
above all an issue of demand: how many farmers would 
be required to ensure the competitiveness of the 
agricultural sector in the region? While the leaked Master 
Plan suggested that, alongside foreign investment, 
specific ‘models’ for these farmers should also be adopted, 
its strategy for implementing these is far from clear. 
A key unresolved issue for the programme outlined 
in the leaked Master Plan related to oversight and 
decision-making procedures. The set of strategies it 
outlined was not accompanied by clear institutional 
arrangements and associated governance and decision-
making processes. It was silent, for example, on the role 
that farmers’ organisations would play in the negotiation 
of investment decisions, contracts, or the management 
of ProSAVANA. Even in Brazil, with its powerful and well-
organised rural social movements actively supported by 
allies within government, experience suggests that 
stronger and more organised actors are generally able 
to capitalise on the incentives provided by programmes 
such as ProSAVANA, sidelining any social and 
environmental concerns that are not written into 
contracts.
Although government officials and ProSAVANA 
representatives maintained that the leaked document 
represented a work in progress and that it had been 
misread by civil society organisations, public statements 
by public authorities in Mozambique and Brazil suggested 
otherwise. In fact, the leaked text was well aligned with 
public statements by Mozambican government officials 
and actors who had a vested interest in ProSAVANA in 
Brazil and Japan. This alignment ensured that the leaking 
of the Master Plan fuelled the escalation of the 
contestation of ProSAVANA. 
Given the repeated refusal by the Mozambican, 
Brazilian and Japanese governments to say what the 
current Plan did contain, since they claimed that its 
content was different from that of the version that had 
been leaked, a transnational coalition of social movements 
and NGOs came together to demand an official position 
on ProSAVANA. This prompted the three governments 
to respond by publishing on the programme’s website 
a Concept Note (ProSAVANA-PD 2013a) that sought to 
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address the key concerns raised by this transnational 
coalition. 
3.2 The Concept Note
The Concept Note made available on the ProSAVANA 
website in September 2013 warned in its introduction 
that it was not a summary of the programme’s Master 
Plan but a document intended to provide a reference 
point for dialogue with stakeholders. The document 
emphasised the ‘improvement of the quality of life’ of 
residents in the area covered by the programme, stating 
that its mission was to promote ‘modernisation of 
agriculture’ and ‘create jobs.’ Significantly, it avoided any 
mention of soybean production zones, emphasising 
instead the establishment of ‘clusters’ to support 
production of tea, cashew and cassava, all crops that 
have long been established in different parts of the 
Corridor.
As articulated in the Concept Note, the rationale 
behind the whole programme was as follows. Poverty is 
a result of low levels of local agricultural productivity. To 
boost productivity four aspects needed to be combined: 
introduction and dissemination of new technologies to 
improve the productivity of land, labour and capital; 
investment in infrastructure to support production flows, 
reducing transport costs that result from the long 
distances from consumer centres; attraction of foreign 
capital to enable the necessary investments, due to low 
local capacity; and finally, the adoption of strategies to 
diversify production by combining crops considered to 
be the ones consumed at the family level with commercial 
crops, ultimately promoting the creation of agribusiness 
clusters.
As it was presented, the Concept Note was a coherent 
document. However, a number of questions remained 
unanswered. For example, in most developing countries 
intensification of farming has meant the reduction of 
rural labour use. As noted above, in Brazil soybean 
production employs, on average, one worker for every 
200ha. The higher the productivity, the lower the demand 
for labour. The programme seemed to suggest that the 
opposite would occur in Mozambique, despite the fact 
that it proposed related activities that also rely on a high 
degree of incorporation of technology. Would these 
activities not lead to discrimination among farmers and 
result in accelerated rural-urban migration and exclusion? 
Similarly, many of the areas that have been affected by 
projects of this nature have seen the replacement of food 
crops by cash crops, as competition generates a struggle 
for factors of production, in particular land and labour. 
It is not clear that Mozambique’s land governance 
structures are sufficiently robust to prevent this problem 
and the resulting rise of monoculture across the whole 
region, as is happening in the Cerrado region of Brazil, 
with its attendant environmental impacts (Cabral and 
Norfolk 2016; Shankland et al. 2016).
Finally, the Concept Note emphasised that the 
government was willing to engage in a dialogue which 
respected the principles of cooperation, according to 
which such conflicts would have to be addressed at 
different phases of implementation. But how far would 
it be possible for the problems identified in ProSAVANA 
to be addressed as the project was implemented, given 
that the principal critiques of the programme related to 
its core rationale? Would it really be possible to address 
them without compromising the envisaged scope of the 
initiative?
3.3 The Zero Draft Master Plan 
The release of the Concept Note was accompanied 
by a modest consultation process that reached fewer 
than a thousand of the Nacala Corridor’s four million 
inhabitants, and raised more questions than it answered. 
Brazilian journalist Amanda Rossi described visiting the 
Corridor in 2013 and being asked ‘what exactly is 
ProSAVANA?’ by peasants wherever she went, 
commenting that ‘not even the institutions responsible 
for the programme explained in concrete terms what it 
was, beyond general statements of intent… given the 
lack of definitive answers, it is understandable that 
doubts remained’ (Rossi 2015: 247). After this brief 
opening-up for a hesitant consultation process that 
served only to intensify the frustrations of those seeking 
concrete answers to their questions, the programme 
entered a long period of official silence during which the 
contestation of ProSAVANA reached a new pitch of 
intensity, as described in Section 4.
Finally, in April 2015, a new round of consultation 
began with the release of a full, officially-sanctioned Zero 
Draft of the Master Plan (MASA 2015). The rationale of 
this Zero Draft is very much in line with official rhetoric 
on agricultural policy in Mozambique in recent decades. 
As we discussed above, agricultural policy in Mozambique 
has historically sought to modernise production and 
commercialisation processes to promote rural 
development. The Zero Draft restates ProSAVANA’s main 
objective as being to strengthen smallholder agriculture 
in order to improve the livelihoods of the inhabitants of 
the Nacala Corridor. As in other agricultural policy 
documents such as PEDSA (MINAG 2011), government 
and the private sector are expected to provide the 
necessary incentives and support. The text emphasises 
support for the region’s main food crops, such as maize, 
cassava, bean and groundnut, in order to ensure food 
security, combined with the production of crops such 
as soybean for the domestic market. 
In many ways, the Zero Draft Master Plan seems to 
have been designed to allay most of the concerns raised 
by Mozambican civil society organisations that contested 
ProSAVANA. The document stresses that land allocation 
will be coordinated by the government in order to ensure 
that no land grabbing takes place and that food 
production will be a priority. 
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Despite having a radically different emphasis from the 
leaked draft, and an ostensibly pro-peasant focus, the 
history of poor communication with Mozambican civil 
society organisations since the outset of the programme 
(Jamal et al. 2012; Jaintilal 2013; Cabral and Leite 2015) 
has led many to regard the Zero Draft with scepticism. 
This scepticism is partly due to the continuing lack of 
information on key issues. For example, the review of 
the Draft Zero Master Plan by Mosca and Bruna (2015) 
notes that while the document puts smallholder farming 
at the centre, it lacks detail on important issues such as 
what roles are envisaged for differentiated groups of 
smallholder farmers. They also note that issues such as 
public sector subsidies and the quantity of private sector 
investments are also not detailed. The joint written 
response of the Mozambican civil society groups that 
make up the ‘No to ProSAVANA’ campaign, whose 
preparation was led by the environmental NGO Justiça 
Ambiental (JÁ, Environmental Justice), was similarly 
critical of the Master Plan’s lack of specificity on key issues 
such as forest protection and water resource management 
and the weak and tentative language in which its 
commitment to guaranteeing the land and other rights 
of peasant communities in the Corridor was expressed, 
despite its extensive use of ‘politically correct’ language 
(Não ao ProSAVANA 2015: 2).
In addition to the lack of detail on some key issues 
that had already been raised by civil society organisations, 
their objections focused on the process by which the 
Master Plan had been developed and discussed, 
criticising in particular a perceived lack of transparency 
and unwillingness to involve NGOs and peasant 
organisations in systematic dialogue. The very process 
of dissemination of the Zero Draft Master Plan was 
contested by an important segment of civil society that 
included UNAC, as the optimism that had greeted 
President Nyusi’s rhetoric at the time the consultation 
process was launched gave way to scepticism and 
accusations that the process had been deeply flawed, 
authoritarian and ‘lacking in democratic spirit’ (Mosca 
and Bruna 2015: 25). The main claim was that standard 
public consultation principles that would have allowed 
for adequate public debates had not been followed, with 
poor communication around the location and timing of 
consultation meetings and intimidating behaviour by 
some local officials that seemed intended to limit rather 
than foster debate. This was compounded by the attitude 
of the Minister of Agriculture and Food Security, who 
stated in a public consultation meeting in Maputo that 
the government was ready to ‘go over any obstacle and 
continue’ with ProSAVANA. In this climate of polarisation 
and mistrust, civil society has had little incentive to focus 
on a more nuanced discussion of what was actually being 
proposed in the Zero Draft, with the result that despite 
the efforts of JÁ and its allies to produce an in-depth 
analysis, much of the current criticism of ProSAVANA 
simply rehearses the old critiques articulated in relation 
to the documents and public statements that preceded 
it. In the next section, we examine how these critiques 
were developed and articulated by peasant movements 
and other groups with which they came to engage 
through an increasingly transnationalized contestation 
process.
4 ProSAVANA and its critics
ProSAVANA came to the attention of civil society 
organisations working on agriculture and with peasants 
in Mozambique in the first half of 2010, when a number 
of official ProSAVANA-related events were organised and 
the media began to reproduce statements by government 
representatives from the three countries hailing the 
programme and its prospects for contributing to the end 
of poverty in Mozambique. Civil society organisations 
grew increasingly concerned at issues such as the size 
of the land area reportedly being allocated to the 
programme and associated fears of land grabbing; the 
prospect of monocultures expanding at the expense of 
age-old diverse agricultural practices; the lack of clarity 
over the role of smallholder agriculture in the projected 
agribusiness-led model; and the potential environmental 
impacts associated with export-oriented mechanised 
agriculture. These concerns echoed the critique of 
Prodecer which had been raised by many civil society 
organisations and academics in Brazil. This critique 
portrayed it as a programme that produced food for the 
world but left many Brazilians landless, undermined 
family farming, degraded land, damaged biodiversity 
and produced negative impacts on the health of the 
population of the areas where it was implemented 
(Schlesinger 2013; Mazzetto Silva 2009). 
The levels of anxiety among pro-peasant civil society 
organisations in Mozambique were heightened by an 
international context that was marked by the 
consequences of the global food and fuel price crisis. 
These consequences extended from urban food riots in 
many countries, including Mozambique (see Brito et al. 
2015), to the intensified interest of transnational private 
capital and richer countries in acquiring agricultural land 
in Africa. The increased prevalence of such ‘land grabs’ 
triggered both local conflicts and national fears over ‘the 
rise of a new type of global geopolitics… where national 
sovereign territory increasingly is subject to non-national 
systems of authority’ (Sassen 2013: 25). Attention to 
Brazil’s role in this process grew along with the rise in 
visibility of the BRICS as development actors, following 
from the intense interest that Chinese agricultural 
investment in Africa had already attracted, despite the 
growing evidence that the real scale of this investment 
had been significantly overstated (Bräutigam 2015). 
The conceptualisation of ProSAVANA was shaped by 
a broad range of forces, including the agribusiness 
development model that had found expression in the 
Brazilian Cerrado under the influence of Prodecer, and 
the global reconfiguration of agribusiness and commodity 
trading networks whose expansion into Africa has found 
political and policy expression in ‘African Green 
Revolution’ discourse and initiatives such as the 
G8-supported New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition. As we discuss in the following sections, its 
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emergence also coincided with a particularly significant 
moment in the trajectories of pro-peasant movements 
in Brazil and Mozambique, and the confluence of these 
factors seemed almost perfectly pitched to stimulate a 
transnational contestation linking Mozambique, Brazil 
and a range of global networks.
4.1 Peasant movements in   
 Mozambique and Brazil: a   
 confluence of trajectories
Peasant movements in Brazil and Mozambique have 
followed very different trajectories, but they have a 
shared history of struggle against neoliberal approaches 
in agriculture policy and against land expropriation. In 
recent years, this has come to underpin an increasingly 
intense process of exchange and collaboration.
In their contestation of the agribusiness-dominated 
development model, Brazilian social movements have 
split into two camps, reflecting different views of agrarian 
conflict. Although the dominant organisations in both 
camps, on the one hand MST and MPA and on the other 
the Federação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura 
Familiar (Fetraf, National Federation of Workers in Family 
Farming), an organization affiliated to CUT, were both 
born under the influence of the Catholic left, in the 
mid-1990s they went their separate ways. 
MST, which is largely composed of landless or more 
impoverished farmers and smallholders, turned its focus 
to mobilising around the category of ‘peasants’ in order 
to establish a unifying frame for the different conditions 
of its members. They no longer focused their opposition 
on traditional large landowners but instead on 
agribusiness. This was because they viewed the 
competitiveness of Brazilian agribusiness not as the result 
of entrepreneurial spirit but as deriving from land 
ownership, which they argued had conferred upon this 
social group the political power that had enabled them 
to capture public funds in order to modernise. In other 
words, Brazilian agricultural modernisation had been 
made possible by the capture of the state by the most 
powerful social groups, accompanied by the exclusion 
of broad masses of farmers. Thus, MST and its allies 
argued that promoting a different model for Brazilian 
agriculture would require rejection of agribusiness.
As noted above, the largest rural workers’ organisation 
in Brazil, CONTAG, had been created in the 1960s but 
followed a largely non-confrontational path until it began 
to place greater emphasis on mobilisation in the context 
of the democratic opening of the 1980s. This brought it 
closer to Fetraf/CUT in the 1990s, as both sets of actors 
abandoned organising around a ‘rural workers’ identity, 
replacing it with a ‘family farmers’ identity. Within this 
camp, mobilisation was articulated as being in opposition 
to agribusiness as a whole, despite the fact that a segment 
of family farming is itself built on the principles of 
productivity and incorporation of technologies used by 
the large-farm segment. This means that in practice the 
unions’ criticism sometimes focuses not on the 
agribusiness model per se but on the priority given to 
the segment of large producers within it.
In response to the shift towards a more radical position 
by the trade union camp, MST created its own arm to 
represent small producers, MPA. At the same time, it 
intensified the efforts it had been developing since the 
1990s to reach out to other movements at the 
international level, through its links with the transnational 
agrarian movement Via Campesina. By this stage, MST 
and MPA could no longer focus their mobilisation only 
on agrarian reform, as had been the case in the 
movement’s original phase, for two reasons. The first is 
that the struggle for land receded in intensity in Brazil 
during the 2000s, as economic growth and expansion 
of urban employment opportunities defused many 
conflicts over land. The second is that internationally MST 
found that it was not necessarily the struggle for land 
that mobilised farmers, but rather opposition to the 
technological model of the agri-food sector. This gave 
rise to the demand for food sovereignty as a message 
that was able to bring together different social movements 
and sectors, including environmental NGOs, to strengthen 
opposition to agribusiness-dominated models.
In Mozambique, UNAC had been created in the early 
1990s as a response to concerns over the future of the 
peasants’ cooperatives that had been established during 
the socialist period, in the context of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme that started in 1987. The initial 
question was whether cooperatives could continue to 
exist in a capitalist economy; having argued that they 
could, UNAC turned its attention to how best to protect 
peasants’ interests in the new neoliberalism-dominated 
context. 
At the centre of UNAC’s project was the idea of 
peasants’ self-organisation. In a radical departure from 
previous party- and state-led experiences, including that 
of its direct precursor organisations such as the General 
Union of Cooperatives in Maputo7 , from the outset UNAC 
sought autonomy from the ruling party and the state in 
order to put peasants’ interests first. In the words of its 
first president, ‘the idea then was to create an institution 
that would stand up for peasants’ rights whether or not 
these peasants were grouped in cooperatives or 
associations.’8  After a nationwide consultation process, 
UNAC held its inaugural assembly in 1994 and presented 
itself as an umbrella organisation whose role was to 
promote the grouping of peasants into cooperatives or 
associations in order to defend their interests. 
Over the course of its two decades of history, the 
organisation has undertaken a diverse range of activities, 
some of which – including the provision of technical 
support to farmers and participation in post-war and 
post-natural disaster reconstruction activities – have 
meant that at times UNAC has acted and been seen as 
an NGO rather than as a social movement or union. 
However, in 1996-1997 UNAC played an important 
mobilising and representational role during the 
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discussions over and dissemination of the new Land Law, 
gaining considerable visibility in the process. Through 
this experience, UNAC not only strengthened its 
relationship with its constituents but also diversified its 
network to include national and international NGOs, 
d e v e l o p m e n t  c o o p e r a t i o n  o r g a n i s a t i o n s , 
parliamentarians, academics and fellow pro-peasant 
institutions.9  It was also in the late 1990s that UNAC first 
connected with Brazil’s MST, and through this link 
became affiliated to Via Campesina. 
The land campaign experience in Mozambique and 
the link with international organisations with similar 
interests that had emerged through Via Campesina 
combined to lead UNAC to reflect on its own agenda 
and activities. At the beginning of the 2000s it began 
internal discussions that led to the development of a 
strategic plan which put the emphasis on advocacy for 
peasants’ rights, leading UNAC to focus on strengthening 
peasants’ organisations, calling for food sovereignty and 
expanding peasants’ political voice.10  
The mid-2000s saw the broadening of fora for civil 
society participation in policy dialogue in Mozambique. 
Public debates and campaigns organised by institutions 
such as Fórum Mulher (FM, Women’s Forum) on gender 
and women’s issues, Grupo Moçambicano da Dívida (GMD, 
the Mozambique Debt Group) on debt relief and the G20 
NGO coalition on civil society participation in anti-
poverty policy through the system of Observatórios de 
Desenvolvimento (Development Observatories) all placed 
demands on UNAC to participate and contribute its views 
on issues relating to the peasantry. The same period saw 
UNAC strengthening its international networks and 
participating for the first time in hosting a Via Campesina 
conference. 
These changes in UNAC’s national and international 
engagements came at a time when most of Mozambique’s 
major aid donors had turned their focus to budget 
support, reducing the flow of project implementation 
funds that NGOs could access. As was the case for other 
Mozambican civil society organisations, UNAC found that 
its human and financial resources were overstretched as 
it sought to respond to the goals it had set itself on 
multiple fronts. The shortage of resources led to the exit 
of key staff members, while also opening up opportunities 
for renewal. After 2010, as donor frustration grew with 
the slow pace of political opening and the failure to 
translate economic growth into poverty reduction in 
Mozambique, a new wave of funding began to flow into 
strengthening civil society organisations. UNAC has been 
a key beneficiary of this change, and has been able to 
recruit a group of young and energetic staff members 
who are working towards strengthening the organisation 
at the grassroots level while also engaging actively in 
public debates on key issues concerning the peasantry. 
This has included engagement in policy dialogue, a 
notable example of which was UNAC’s contribution to 
the development of PEDSA, currently the document of 
reference for agrarian development in Mozambique. It 
has also included increasingly high-visibility contestation 
of government policy, the most prominent example of 
which has been over ProSAVANA.
4.2 Contesting ProSAVANA in   
 Mozambique and Brazil
Mozambican civil society organisations concerned 
about the implications of ProSAVANA initially found 
themselves faced with scant information and recurring 
contradictions in official statements. They therefore 
began to look for alternative sources of information in 
Mozambique, Brazil and Japan to enable them to take a 
position regarding the programme. They were able to 
access documents and news through networks such as 
Via Campesina and through international NGOs which 
operated in all three countries. These transnational links 
became increasingly important as the contestation 
process evolved.
In 2011, a series of media reports in Brazil highlighted 
a drive to attract Brazilian agricultural investment in the 
Nacala Corridor that was explicitly linked to ProSAVANA, 
with one report stating that the Mozambican government 
had made six million hectares available for occupation 
by Brazilian commercial farmers in the provinces of 
Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Zambézia (Mello 
2011). This suggestion that a wave of Brazilian agribusiness 
land acquisitions in Mozambique was imminent triggered 
a flurry of activity among Brazilian civil society actors 
that had hitherto paid little attention to their country’s 
growing role in Mozambique. 
To established Brazilian development NGOs such as 
the Federação de Órgãos de Assistência Social e Educacional 
(FASE, Federation of Organizations for Social and 
Educational Assistance), the Instituto Brasileiro de Análises 
Sociais e Econômicas (IBASE, Brazilian Institute for Social 
and Economic Analysis), and the Instituto de Estudos 
Socioeconômicos (INESC, Institute for Socioeconomic 
Studies), ProSAVANA seemed to represent the intersection 
of global capitalist forces, whose impacts on marginalised 
rural populations in Brazil they had long denounced, with 
a corporate-dominated expansion of Brazilian presence 
overseas about which they were feeling a growing 
unease. Brazil’s rush into Africa had left them – and the 
progressive forces with which they were aligned – behind. 
This had denied them a role in exporting the more 
progressive of the country’s many ‘models’, ensuring that 
(as they saw it) only the most socially regressive and 
environmentally destructive of these models made the 
journey to Africa. To make things worse, they had been 
virtually excluded from the new flows of both government 
and private-sector funding that were going into this 
African expansion, at a critical moment when the 
Northern aid-funding on which they had depended for 
decades was rapidly drying up. 
These organisations activated their links and alliances 
in academia and in the more accessible branches of 
government, ensuring that their concerns circulated 
among a subset of the intelligentsia linked to progressive 
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political parties, including the ruling PT. They also 
strategised with their friends among the remaining 
international NGOs with a presence in Brazil, many of 
whom belonged to the same networks. They secured 
support from ActionAid, Oxfam and the German political 
foundations to organise field visits to Mozambique, to 
publish reports and to welcome delegations of 
Mozambican activists whose eyes they could open to 
the future which awaited them if they did not resist the 
advance of the particular ‘Brazilian model’ represented 
by ProSAVANA (Ferreira 2013; Mello 2013). 
One such visit by Mozambican civil society 
organisations in search of information led in 2012 to the 
production of a video documentary entitled  ‘A face oculta 
do ProSAVANA’ (‘The Hidden Face of ProSAVANA’). The 
documentary presents Brazilian farmers’ first-hand 
experiences of Prodecer as reported to representatives 
of Mozambican civil society organisations including 
UNAC and ORAM-Associação Rural de Ajuda Mútua 
(ORAM-Rural Association for Mutual Support). It was 
filmed on a trip to the agribusiness-dominated state of 
Mato Grosso that was organised by FASE and funded by 
a variety of international NGOs and foundations including 
Oxfam and the German Left Party’s Rosa Luxemburg 
Stiftung. In the documentary the ‘Brazilian model’ of 
agricultural development is visually presented through 
long takes showing vast expanses of sugarcane or 
soybean monoculture, vividly contrasting with images 
of the rich and diverse miombo woodlands of the Nacala 
Corridor and with stock footage of naked Brazilian 
indigenous children splashing happily in an unpolluted 
stream. It is narrated through stories told by Brazilian 
small farmers and indigenous activists who have lost 
land or have been squeezed out of markets. It is depicted 
as embodied in the pesticides that Mato Grosso residents 
describe as being sprayed indiscriminately from planes 
to poison the land and the people of what was once the 
Cerrado. Although the documentary film was recorded 
during a trip to Brazil choreographed by FASE, it was 
edited in Maputo in a process overseen by UNAC and 
carries an unmistakeably Mozambican framing of 
Brazilian realities that provided a powerful counterpoint 
to the largely Brazilianised narratives of ProSAVANA 
circulating in civil society and the media.
Since ProSAVANA had by now become a central issue 
in UNAC’s work, this documentary was shown in most 
meetings organised or co-organised by UNAC and where 
issues related to land and peasants were discussed. The 
video provided a more powerful way of communicating 
what was at stake in ProSAVANA than documents or 
speeches, particularly among UNAC’s grassroots 
constituencies where literacy levels are low and command 
of Portuguese is often limited. Peasants who had watched 
the documentary told us that it had significantly 
contributed to the way they now understood the 
‘Brazilian model’ of agrarian development. 
The documentary was also used at the national level 
in various civil society meetings to raise awareness of 
the dangers of land expropriation, environmental 
impacts and general degradation of peasant’s livelihoods. 
Its clarity and power contrasted effectively with the 
evasive and often contradictory messages that emerged 
from the Mozambican government over the course of 
2013 and 2014, while the publication of the Master Plan 
was repeatedly delayed. Government officials’ attempts 
to allay the fears articulated in the film after the draft 
Master Plan was leaked in 2013 were not convincing 
enough, especially because of the uncoordinated 
manner in which official pronouncements were made 
and the ambiguities that remained even after the 
ProSAVANA Concept Note was released later that year.
In May 2013, Mozambican civil society organisations 
disseminated an open letter to the Presidents of 
Mozambique and Brazil and the Prime Minister of Japan 
demanding that ProSAVANA be halted in order to allow 
for public consultation and reflection on the project. 
UNAC and JÁ were at the forefront of the campaign at 
the national level, but a key role in convening the 
discussions that led to the production of the letter was 
played by civil society groups based within the Nacala 
Corridor itself, especially those linked to the Plataforma 
Provincial de Organizações da Sociedade Civil de Nampula 
(PPOSC-N, Nampula Civil Society Platform). Although 
government officials at different levels did attempt to 
respond to the points raised in the letter, no formal 
response was provided until August 2014, and in the 
meantime publ ic  speeches by government 
representatives at different levels ended up feeding a 
continuous cycle of conjecture about the real nature of 
ProSAVANA (see e.g. Funada-Classen 2013a). 
Paradoxically, it was this lack of clarity that intensified 
the debate over ProSAVANA, as different agendas and 
fears were projected onto the programme. Between 2013 
and 2014 ProSAVANA became the subject of a growing 
range of public pronouncements by national and 
international authority figures and increasingly heated 
debate in civil society and academic fora (Fingermann 
2013; Funada-Classen 2013b). In 2013 and 2014, 
ProSAVANA was the subject of discussion in most national 
and international meetings organised by UNAC. 
Ultimately a civil society campaign was launched to reject 
the programme before the official statement of what it 
would actually do – the Master Plan – had even been 
published (UNAC 2014).
Among Mozambican civil society organisations, UNAC 
emerged as one of the key institutions articulating the 
opposition to ProSAVANA, as it was uniquely positioned 
to link the local, regional, national and international 
levels. As noted above, the documentary film ‘A face 
oculta do ProSAVANA’ had given UNAC’s young Maputo-
based activists a powerful tool for communicating with 
grassroots peasant associations in the Nacala Corridor 
whom they had previously struggled to mobilise. The 
organisation’s geographical reach allowed it to convene 
mass meetings of peasant leaders at both the regional 
and national levels, and its recruitment of technical 
advisers with a background in environmental 
campaigning helped it to build common ground with 
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the green coalition led by JÁ. The development of this 
common ground with environmental NGOs was also 
supported by the growing prominence in UNAC’s 
discourse of agroecology, the focus of an exchange 
programme with MPA that had resulted from contacts 
established through Via Campesina. Its links with 
Japanese academics helped UNAC representatives to 
secure invitations to Japan, including a high-visibility 
visit organised to coincide with the Tokyo International 
Conference on African Development (TICAD) in 2013. 
In Brazil, it was a combination of Via Campesina 
connections and more recent NGO links (which 
themselves had been developed with the support of 
international NGOs) that in December 2013 secured an 
invitation for a UNAC spokesperson to present the 
organisation’s views on Brazil-Mozambique agricultural 
development cooperation at a meeting of the Conselho 
Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional (CONSEA, 
National Council on Food and Nutrition Security), a key 
site for formal government-civil society policy dialogue. 
This contributed to a resolution that included strongly-
worded criticism of ProSAVANA (CONSEA 2013: 6). Given 
CONSEA’s formal status and political prestige, this made 
it impossible for the Brazilian government to ignore the 
controversy. The government reluctantly began to treat 
the impacts of its international development cooperation 
activities as a legitimate subject for public debate, 
effectively ‘putting an end to the insulation of cooperation 
from wider state-society dynamics’ (Cabral and Leite 
2015: 440).
After more than a year of waiting for a formal response 
to the open letter demanding information and public 
consultation on ProSAVANA, further delays in the 
publication of the Master Plan and a series of unsatisfactory 
meetings with ProSAVANA and government 
representatives, UNAC and a number of Mozambican 
civil society organisations decided in mid-2014 to launch 
the ‘No to ProSAVANA’ campaign to stop the programme 
altogether. This became the focus of the largest 
transnational gathering that the civil society campaign 
had yet seen, the Triangular Peoples’ Conference held in 
Maputo in July 2014. This conference brought together 
a broad range of Japanese and Brazilian civil society 
groups, including several (such as Brazil’s CONTAG) that 
had not previously been very visible in the campaign, as 
well as key leaders from some of the most important 
Maputo-based NGOs, including FM and Liga dos Direitos 
Humanos (LDH, Human Rights League). 
However, the presence of NGO leaders from the Nacala 
Corridor itself was considerably less visible at the 
Triangular Peoples’ Conference, and the key Nampula-
based civil society platform PPOSC-N was notably absent 
from the list of ‘No to ProSAVANA’ declaration signatories. 
This signalled that despite UNAC’s efforts to maintain 
connections with grassroots constituencies, the dynamics 
of engagement within ProSAVANA’s target region were 
diverging from those at the national and transnational 
levels. Within the Corridor, a more complex picture was 
emerging that saw some NGOs remaining vocally 
opposed to the programme while others opted for 
constructively critical engagement that aimed to improve 
the content of ProSAVANA rather than halting it 
altogether. Some local peasant associations (as well as 
some UNAC-linked Provincial Peasant Unions) had 
become more intensely mobilised after experiencing 
land conflicts as a result of foreign agricultural investment. 
Some of this investment has involved projects that have 
been seen as ‘ProSAVANA projects’ because they have 
benefited from JICA support via a budget line that was 
branded as part of ProSAVANA despite having a separate 
genesis from the main trilateral programme, and the 
impression of being part of the trilateral programme has 
been strengthened by JICA’s use of Brazilian consultants 
(Mosca and Bruna 2015). Other local associations had 
become more muted in their opposition to the 
programme, as they were caught between promises of 
development benefits and fear of government reprisals 
in the increasingly tense political climate that 
characterised the Nacala Corridor in the period preceding 
and immediately after the October 2014 Mozambican 
Presidential elections.
The elections dominated public debate in Mozambique 
in the second half of 2014, which meant that the ‘No to 
ProSAVANA’ campaign rapidly lost visibility. A similar 
process happened in Brazil, where a bitterly contested 
election campaign saw PT-sympathising civil society 
groups draw back from explicit criticism of the 
government’s international engagements for fear of 
providing the opposition with ammunition, which meant 
that there was little follow-up to the involvement of 
Mozambican civil society groups in the international 
mobilisation around the Brazil BRICS Summit in July 2014 
(Poskitt et al. 2016). As outlined above, the narrow 
re-election of PT President Dilma Rousseff was followed 
by a deepening of the political crisis, which culminated 
in her impeachment. The interim administration that 
replaced Brazil’s PT-led government in August 2016 
shifted strongly towards a Northern-aligned rather than 
a South-South-focused foreign policy, and showed no 
interest in resuscitating Brazil’s faltering development 
cooperation programmes with African countries such 
as Mozambique. 
In Mozambique, by contrast, the electoral process was 
followed by an apparent fresh start, as President Nyusi’s 
new cabinet was quick to seek out NGO leaders for 
dialogue, including over ProSAVANA, while several 
leading civil society figures accepted government jobs. 
This process of realignment often attracted accusations 
of co-optation; while these were similar to those that 
had greeted the migration of NGO leaders into 
government after the PT came to power in Brazil, there 
was a greater degree of mistrust between ruling party 
and civil society in Mozambique. This mistrust was 
intensified by the actions of hardline groups within 
Frelimo, widely suspected of being behind attempts to 
intimidate figures who were perceived as being too close 
to the opposition, as well as more extreme acts such as 
the assassination of the academic Gilles Cistac in March 
2015 (Hanlon 2015). 
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In April 2015 the government released the Zero Draft 
Master Plan and organised a fresh round of consultations 
throughout the Nacala Corridor and in Maputo. However, 
as discussed above, the public consultation meetings 
did not mark the hoped-for transformation in patterns 
of engagement. The process as a whole was highly 
contested by some civil society organisations including 
UNAC, who complained that it was being manipulated 
by government organisers to ensure a preponderant 
presence of people who supported ProSAVANA; that the 
whole process did not take into consideration legally 
established procedures for public consultation; and that 
it was being led by government officials who showed 
little interest in accommodation with dissident voices. 
In response, government representatives questioned the 
presence of peasant organisation representatives from 
outside the areas where consultation was taking place, 
claiming that they were not peasants and simply wanted 
to oppose ProSAVANA – thereby questioning UNAC’s 
legitimacy as an organisation capable of speaking for 
peasants at every level from the local to the international. 
UNAC did not in fact associate itself with the most 
radical denunciations of the consultation process; these 
came from Acção Académica para o Desenvolvimento das 
Comunidades Rurais (ADECRU, Academic Action for the 
Development of Rural Communities), a small advocacy 
NGO with its origins in the student movement whose 
members included several current and former UNAC 
advisers but which was not formally affiliated with the 
peasant movement organisation. It was ADECRU that in 
September 2015 produced the follow-up video to the 
UNAC/ORAM ‘Face Oculta do ProSAVANA’ documentary, 
a film entitled ‘ProSAVANA: Terra Usurpada, Vida Roubada’ 
(‘ProSAVANA: Land Grabbed, Life Stolen’) that deployed 
revolutionary slogans and confrontational language 
alongside footage recycled from the earlier documentary. 
UNAC did not associate itself with the new film’s more 
inflammatory discourse, though it remained critical of 
the consultation process. Instead of repeating the video-
based mobilisation strategy it had deployed so effectively 
in 2013 and 2014, UNAC joined with JÁ and other 
establishment NGOs in producing a careful, densely-
argued, 22-page critique of the Zero Draft Master Plan 
(Não ao ProSAVANA 2015). Although this concluded with 
a call for ProSAVANA to be abandoned and for the 
government to initiate a new round of consultations in 
order to prepare a ‘national strategy for the development 
of family farming’ (a longstanding UNAC demand), the 
details of the critique left open various entry points for 
possible negotiation, welcoming some aspects of the 
Master Plan and calling for more information on others 
rather than for their outright rejection. 
However, the level of polarisation and mistrust around 
the programme was already so high that it proved 
impossible to build on this more measured and nuanced 
approach to critique of ProSAVANA. In January 2016, a 
workshop was organized in Nampula with the intent of 
restarting the consultation process. It was co-hosted by 
civil society platforms from the region covered by 
ProSAVANA and facilitated by consultants who had been 
hired by JICA specifically to deliver a better level of 
dialogue with civil society, but the event became 
dominated by disagreements between the organisers 
and the Maputo-based activists representing UNAC at 
the meeting, at one point degenerating into a physical 
confrontation. In February the ‘No to ProSAVANA’ 
campaign released a note denouncing the workshop as 
part of a process of ‘forced legitimation’ and describing 
it as ‘stained by serious irregularities which once more 
confirm the prevalence in the ProSAVANA programme 
of irredeemable conceptual and procedural flaws’ (Não 
ao ProSAVANA 2016: 1). 
 
5 Beyond the contestation of  
 ProSAVANA
The preceding sections have shown how the 
contestation process led to a transformation of the official 
discourse on ProSAVANA, whose Zero Draft Master Plan 
has abandoned many of the most controversial features 
of the version that was leaked in 2013. In this final section, 
we examine the extent to which the contestation process 
has produced wider transformative effects on the civil 
society organisations involved – particularly UNAC and 
its Via Campesina allies MST and MPA – and on patterns 
of civil society-state engagement around agricultural 
development and international cooperation policy in 
Mozambique and Brazil.
5.1 ProSAVANA and the    
 changing forms of peasant   
 movement organisation in   
 Mozambique
One of our initial assumptions in undertaking this 
research was that the patterns of organisation of the 
Mozambican peasantry were changing as part of a 
movement led by UNAC in response to an ongoing 
agrarian transformation. We also assumed that the recent 
changes in UNAC’s discourses about rural development 
in general and ProSAVANA in particular had been driven 
by the intensification of its links with the Brazilian MST 
through Via Campesina. Over the course of fieldwork we 
found ourselves having to revisit both of these 
assumptions.
In our fieldwork in the Nacala Corridor we did find 
that a reshaping of peasant organisation was under way, 
but not as part of a movement led by UNAC in response 
to an agrarian transformation. Instead, the driving factor 
appears to be the Mozambican state’s effort to re-engage 
with small producers and organise them into associations 
to facilitate the channelling of state and donor resources 
and the process of negotiation around land rights and 
agricultural investment. This effort follows a breakdown 
in trust provoked by forced collectivisation in the 1980s, 
the chaos of the armed conflict and then a long period 
when formal associational life was largely a construct of 
rural development programmes implemented by 
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international NGOs. It is driven more by political than by 
economic considerations, with new rural development 
funds being used to consolidate Frelimo patronage 
networks as a bulwark against the supposed risk that 
the peasantry might turn towards Renamo, the opposition 
party-cum-guerrilla movement which (as noted above) 
emerged from the 2014 elections greatly strengthened 
in the key provinces of the Nacala Corridor region, and 
which has now turned once more to armed actions in 
support of its demand for ‘autonomous governments’ in 
the region. 
UNAC is in an ongoing process of organisational 
change at provincial level and at the grassroots, as it 
engages with the new government-supported 
associations while seeking to build a capillary structure 
that will legitimate its national-level representation 
claims. While remaining uncompromising regarding 
ProSAVANA, UNAC has sought to find a balance at the 
national level between the need to take a firm anti-
ProSAVANA position and the desire not to close down 
space for engaging with government on agricultural 
development more broadly; and at the subnational level 
between the need to affirm its new provincial-level 
structures as active defenders of peasants’ rights and the 
desires of autonomous district-level associations to 
engage with programmes that may bring concrete 
benefits to their members and/or to avoid antagonising 
local power structures. 
We also found that while UNAC’s public position has 
indeed been influenced by its engagement with Brazilian 
social movements, the discursive interchange with Brazil 
is much less confined to the Via Campesina network than 
we first thought. The most important sponsors of UNAC’s 
recent engagements with Brazil, including the 2012 visit 
to Mato Grosso that led to the production of the ‘Face 
Oculta do ProSAVANA’ video documentary and the 2013 
audience with the National Food and Nutrition Security 
Council, have been mainstream development NGOs such 
as FASE, INESC and IBASE rather than MST and MPA. Even 
with MST and MPA the pattern of engagement is more 
complex and longstanding than we had first thought. 
In the Nacala Corridor we interviewed peasant leaders 
who had visited Brazil more than 15 years ago, in 
exchanges sponsored by Northern NGOs as part of the 
international solidarity movement that followed the 
Eldorado dos Carajás massacre of MST protesters. MPA 
does have an important and longstanding collaboration 
with UNAC, but this is currently focused more on an 
attempt to transfer agroecological farming techniques 
than on training for grassroots political mobilisation. 
Agroecology is also a link between UNAC’s discourse 
and that of its most important Mozambican civil society 
ally, the NGO JÁ, which in turn is part of Friends of the 
Earth International. This is a global network in which – 
unlike in Via Campesina – Brazilian NGOs are relatively 
insignificant players compared with their European and 
Asian counterparts. As Brazil’s role in ProSAVANA has 
declined in importance, the role played by Japan (both 
in ProSAVANA and in the wider programme of investments 
in the Nacala Corridor) has become more visible, and 
links between UNAC and Japanese NGOs have acquired 
greater significance. Thus UNAC’s emerging discourse 
on ProSAVANA is being co-constructed not only with 
Brazilian agrarian movements through Via Campesina 
but also with local associations, national environmental 
NGOs and transnational networks where its main 
interlocutors are neither Brazilian nor represent peasant 
constituencies.
5.2 ProSAVANA and the changing  
 nature of Brazilian engagement
As noted above, our mapping of Mozambique-Brazil 
civil society exchanges led us to realise that North-South 
development NGO networks have become more 
important facilitators of these exchanges than Via 
Campesina, and that mainstream Brazilian NGOs such 
as FASE, IBASE and INESC have now become significant 
interlocutors for UNAC and the other Mozambican actors 
contesting ProSAVANA – arguably more so than MST. 
We also observed the emphatic engagement of 
CONTAG, Brazil’s largest rural workers’ union and an 
historic political rival of MST, in the transnational 
mobilisations against ProSAVANA in Maputo in July 2014. 
CONTAG’s significance comes from its status as a key 
member of CUT, the union movement that is aligned 
with Brazil’s PT, and from its influence over sectors of the 
MDA, which at the time was increasingly competing with 
the MAPA for leadership in Brazilian agricultural 
development cooperation (Cabral 2015). The MDA was 
expected to play a role in the ‘model-based’ agricultural 
extension programme, ProSAVANA-PEM, but CONTAG’s 
high-visibility adherence to the ‘No to ProSAVANA’ 
campaign signalled that this was becoming less likely. 
In the event, the MDA and its allies decided to abandon 
any attempt to take over ProSAVANA and to invest instead 
in other ways of exporting the more smallholder-friendly 
of Brazil’s many agricultural development strategies, 
including the ‘More Food International’ and ‘Purchase 
from Africa for Africans’ (PAA) programmes (Cabral et al. 
2016).
PAA, which is run in partnership with the United 
Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP) and Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) but which began life as 
a Brazilian domestic policy initiative called the Programa 
de Aquisição de Alimentos (Food Purchase Programme), 
has become a key symbol of the potential of Brazilian 
experience to support rather than threaten family 
farming in Africa, in explicit contrast with ProSAVANA. 
PAA was actively promoted by CONSEA, which became 
one of the preeminent spaces for government-civil 
society policy dialogue during the latter years of PT rule 
in Brazil, and sought to internationalise its remit as 
Brazilian successes in reducing hunger and undernutrition 
began to be channelled into international programmes 
that sought to export successful Brazilian ‘models’. 
Following its 2013 initiative of calling UNAC 
representatives as witnesses in a debate on Brazil’s role 
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in promoting food security in Mozambique, CONSEA 
linked up with PAA to invite Mozambican activists from 
ORAM and FM as well as UNAC to its major national 
conference in Brasília in November 2015 (PAA 2015). 
CONTAG, FASE, IBASE and INESC were not only formally 
connected with government through their seats on key 
federal policy councils such as CONSEA, but also had 
ready access to influential allies in the Brazilian Presidency 
through longstanding informal networks dating back 
well before the PT came to power in 2003. One of the 
key sites in which these networks interacted with the 
debates around ProSAVANA was the Grupo de Reflexão 
sobre Relações Internacionais (GR-RI, Reflection Group on 
International Relations), a discussion forum bringing 
together influential thinkers from across the 
internationalist Brazilian Left (including independents 
and members of the Communist and Socialist parties as 
well as of the ruling PT) which is defined by one of its 
founders as ‘an informal group that gathers progressive 
and left-wing intellectuals, political activists, civil society 
movements and political party representatives, besides 
some civil servants (as individuals) from the Presidency 
and federal ministries, including Itamaraty [the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs]’.11  Significantly, these networks also 
included staff from the Brazilian branches of the 
international NGOs Oxfam and ActionAid, which as noted 
above played a key role in facilitating links with 
Mozambique and funding exchange visits such as the 
one which led to the UNAC ‘Face Oculta do ProSAVANA’ 
video. 
These networks and spaces such as the GR-RI have 
become increasingly active in pushing for greater public 
debate on Brazil’s South-South cooperation activities and 
its foreign policy in general (Milani and Pinheiro 2013). 
This effort rose in intensity as Brazil’s role in the BRICS 
grouping became more prominent, especially with the 
announcement at the 2014 BRICS Summit in Brazil that 
the grouping would establish a New Development Bank 
to fund infrastructure investment in these countries 
themselves and in Africa, raising the temperature of civil 
society debate over the risk of international engagements 
serving to promote ‘the export of Brazil’s contradictions’ 
(Leite et al. 2014). Within this broader agenda, ProSAVANA 
became an important symbolic resource for raising public 
awareness of Brazil’s role in Africa, in effect producing a 
coherent vision of this role that was absent on the ground 
but nonetheless acquired a political reality – another 
example of how the programme has functioned as a 
focus for performative discourses. 
5.3 Emerging trends 
On the day of the launching of his 2014 electoral 
campaign, Frelimo’s candidate Filipe Nyusi promised in 
Nampula, ‘Vamos transformar Moçambique numa 
potência agrícola’ : ‘We are going to transform 
Mozambique into an agricultural powerhouse’. In 
Nampula such promises have become commonplace, 
with district administrators repeatedly announcing the 
potential benefits of agricultural projects such as 
ProSAVANA (and in some cases threatening to prosecute 
their detractors). For the national and local elite, the lure 
of agribusiness-driven agrarian transformation remains 
as strong as when ProSAVANA was first conceived. But 
for the peasants of Nampula and of Mozambique, 
ProSAVANA remains a vague and poorly-understood 
proposition that seems as likely to represent a threat as 
an opportunity. Following the dissemination of the Zero 
Draft Master Plan there is now more of an indication of 
what the implementation of ProSAVANA might look like, 
but many unanswered questions remain. 
One thing does, however, seem to be certain: the 
domestic and transnational forces that have given rise 
to such widespread concern over issues such as land 
grabbing, environmental destruction and the stamping 
out of smallholder agriculture by export oriented 
agribusiness are no longer operating principally through 
ProSAVANA. In their analysis of the Zero Draft Master 
Plan, Mosca and Bruna  (2015: 30) conclude that the 
relationship between ProSAVANA and the broader 
development strategy for the Nacala Corridor is far from 
clear, asking ‘is ProSAVANA the agricultural component 
of the Nacala Corridor Development Strategy? Or is it 
only the family farming component?’. The broader 
strategy is more clearly expressed in the new regional 
initiative, PEDEC, which aims to promote ‘integrated 
development strategies’ across five provinces, including 
the three covered by ProSAVANA (Oriental Consultants 
et al. 2014: 1). PEDEC is a bilateral Japan-Mozambique 
initiative, which makes no mention of Brazilian 
involvement – or indeed of ProSAVANA. Meanwhile, the 
Brazilian consultants from GV Agro who designed the 
controversial first version of the Master Plan to 
complement a private-sector but government-backed 
‘Nacala Fund’ no longer play any formal role in ProSAVANA 
– but GV Agro’s sister firm GV Projetos has begun to 
promote a rebranded and repositioned Nacala Fund 
which this time has been negotiated directly with the 
Government of Mozambique, bypassing the Brazilian 
and Japanese official development cooperation agencies 
(Amorim 2014: 12). PEDEC and the Nacala Fund have 
made little progress as investor confidence in 
Mozambique has collapsed following the revelation of 
the country’s high levels of “secret debt” (Castel-Branco 
et al. 2016). However, they are likely to attract renewed 
interest as commodity prices recover and Mozambique 
submits once more to the strictures of the global financial 
regime – despite the risk of heightened social conflicts 
(in the Nacala Corridor and elsewhere) that will 
accompany the inevitable structural adjustment process.
Thus the geostrategic alliances and global capital 
networks that converged around the initial conception 
of ProSAVANA, having been edited out of the programme’s 
official discourse, are now pursuing their interests in the 
Nacala Corridor through other mechanisms, largely 
shielded from the active contestation that ProSAVANA 
has attracted and the demands for public accountability 
to which the programme’s status as a government 
development cooperation initiative has exposed it. 
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Nevertheless, a coalition of some of Mozambique’s most 
important civil society groups, headed by UNAC, 
continues to make ‘No to ProSAVANA’ their principal 
rallying-cry for opposing externally-driven development 
in the Nacala Corridor, despite the apparently diminished 
threat represented by the programme and the growing 
threat posed by other initiatives operating outside the 
ProSAVANA frame. It may be that ProSAVANA – a simple, 
easily-identifiable brand onto which could be projected 
fears of land-grabbing, biodiversity loss, transnational 
corporate encroachment, Japanese government 
resource-seeking, Brazilian government ‘sub-imperialism’ 
and Mozambican government authoritarianism – has 
simply been too potent a focus for mobilisation for 
opposition to it to be abandoned in favour of engagement 
with the complex, multi-dimensional ongoing process 
of penetration of the Nacala Corridor by transnational 
capital. 
The performative power of ProSAVANA as a focus for 
mobilisation is evident at the transnational level, where 
we have observed that, despite the absence of widespread 
field implementation of the programme, it is already 
producing a number of important effects. As we have 
noted, the contestation of ProSAVANA has provided an 
opportunity for the strengthening of international civil 
society alliances, both through bilateral exchanges such 
as the one in 2012 that gave rise to the ‘Face Oculta do 
ProSAVANA’ video and through Triangular Peoples’ 
Conferences such as those in 2013 and 2014 which 
brought together Mozambican, Brazilian and Japanese 
civil society organisations to discuss ProSAVANA. 
Although Japanese NGO-state engagements are beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that the level 
of Japanese civil society interest in the country’s role in 
Mozambique has increased exponentially since the 
contestation of ProSAVANA began, and is now one of 
the most significant factors shaping the reorientation of 
the programme. As discussed above, in Brazil ProSAVANA 
has provided a powerful focus for civil society efforts to 
open up public debate on the country’s development 
cooperation activities – though now that Brazil’s foreign 
policy priorities have undergone a radical shift under 
the new government, the symbolic value of ProSAVANA 
has been greatly reduced. The networks that the 
contestation of ProSAVANA helped to catalyse within 
Brazil remain, but they are currently struggling to 
reconfigure themselves and find new ways of operating 
within a political landscape that has been transformed 
by the end of PT rule.
In Mozambique the contestation of ProSAVANA has 
provided unprecedented opportunities for national 
NGOs and UNAC’s Maputo-based leadership to establish 
new links with the local peasant associations that they 
had long struggled to mobilise, leading one activist to 
reflect that ‘perhaps ProSAVANA will be a “necessary evil” 
– necessary in order to provoke negatively affected 
communities to rise up’ (Monjane 2015: 1). Thus the 
process of mobilising social support and engaging the 
government has not only had a productive effect in 
shifting ProSAVANA’s official discourse towards its current 
pro-smallholder agriculture emphasis, but also on the 
internal dynamics of organisations such as UNAC, as well 
as (more problematically) on relations between Maputo-
based and Nampula-based civil society groups. 
The Mozambican government has responded to this 
dramatic evolution in UNAC’s ability to project itself as 
a political actor with a mix of threats, concessions and 
co-optation attempts. At various points during the 
contestation process, government representatives 
deployed a nationalistic tone, accusing UNAC of being 
the puppet of foreign interests, and implying that public 
statements such as the open letter calling for the 
programme to be halted had been written by MST. UNAC 
has undoubtedly imported elements of MST discourse 
over time, and there are important historic links between 
these two Via Campesina member organisations, but 
however much it might suit the Mozambican government 
to project it as such, this is far from being a simple story 
of MST discourses being taken up uncritically by UNAC. 
As we have seen, the Via Campesina link has come to be 
complemented and in some areas even overshadowed 
by other Mozambique-Brazil civil society interactions. 
Critically, throughout all these interactions, Mozambican 
actors have actively been shaping the perceptions of 
their Brazilian interlocutors, and not only articulating 
their own narratives about the perceived threat to 
peasants’ land and livelihoods but also constructing 
‘Mozambicanised’ narratives about Brazil that balance 
the Brazilianised social imaginaries of Mozambique that 
are increasingly present in Brazilian public discourse 
(Shankland and Gonçalves 2016).
Other, less directly nationalistic arguments were used 
by government officials during the public consultations 
over the Zero Draft Master Plan, including the accusation 
that NGO and UNAC representatives were sabotaging 
the process for political reasons or that they were 
travelling to these events from Maputo only to receive 
per diems. Several activists also reported having received 
threats from officials or Frelimo representatives. 
At the same time, however, the government continued 
to make overtures to civil society, leading some UNAC 
leaders to start to argue that a less confrontational 
approach would yield better results.
 Following the highly contested process of public 
consultation on the Zero Draft Master Plan, the 
Mozambican government promised to take into 
consideration the inputs it had received. Meanwhile, as 
noted above,  both Mozambican academics and some 
civil society organisations (including UNAC) moved away 
from blanket condemnation of the kind articulated in 
ADECRU’s video ‘ProSAVANA: Terra Usurpada, Vida 
Roubada’ and begun instead to look more closely at the 
ProSAVANA documentation that is now in the public 
domain in order to produce focused responses addressing 
specific aspects of the programme (Mosca and Bruna 
2015; Não ao ProSAVANA 2015). 
This emerging dynamic of increased government 
responsiveness and more technically-oriented civil 
society engagement offered the possibility of starting 
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to defuse the tensions for which ProSAVANA had become 
such a powerful focus. However, the confrontations 
around the Nampula consultation workshop in January 
2016 indicated that these tensions would stay close to 
the surface as long as the prevailing logic of top-down, 
externally-driven agrarian transformation in the Nacala 
Corridor remained unchanged. No sooner had the 
ProSAVANA management unit announced the creation 
of a civil society engagement mechanism than the ‘No 
to ProSAVANA’ coalition was denouncing the regional 
NGO platforms that had agreed to join it for having been 
co-opted and the consultancy firm that had been hired 
by JICA to manage the process as a front for a longstanding 
effort by WWF to buy the compliance of local civil society 
groups. 12 
Tensions over the response to ProSAVANA within 
Mozambique’s civil society between NGOs based in 
Maputo and those located in the Nacala Corridor have 
escalated since the initial consultation meeting.13 
Although the formal creation of the Mecanismo de 
Coordenação da Sociedade Civil para o Desenvolvimento 
do Corredor de Nacala (Civil Society Coordination 
Mechanism for the Northern Corridor, MCSC-CN) was 
supported by the regional civil society platforms in 
Nampula, Zambézia and Niassa, it was denounced by 
the Maputo-based, Brazilian and Japanese civil society 
groups of the No To ProSAVANA campaign, which 
described as “fraudulent” JICA’s funding arrangements 
for the mechanism and for the consultancy contracted 
to revise the Master Plan with civil society participation.14 
At the same time, growing tensions over the armed 
opposition group Renamo’s calls for devolution to Central 
and Northern Provinces have given such North-South 
divisions a much harsher edge in the current Mozambican 
political context.  
As the successive pro-smallholder revisions to the 
programme reduced the level of threat represented by 
ProSAVANA, other potential threats began to come to 
the fore, and some civil society groups recognised the 
need to shift the focus of contestation away from a 
specific emphasis on ProSAVANA towards a broader 
debate about the development process in the Nacala 
Corridor. However, on the evidence to date it seems that 
it has not been possible to maintain the connections 
forged during the ProSAVANA contestation process 
between local, regional, national and international civil 
society groups. 
An analysis published in August 2016 by a Japanese 
civil society coalition concluded that the campaign 
against ProSAVANA had included “the first-ever cross-
tri-frontier and trans-continental civic activities… to 
protect the rights and food sovereignty of local peasants 
and communities collectively”, and that these activities 
have “encouraged and empowered the peoples and 
organisations of the three countries, succeeding in public 
and private policy shifts, bringing fruitful outcomes, and 
offering fresh learning experiences, but has also resulted 
in tremendous pains, especially to the leaders of 
Mozambican peasants and civil society organisations” 
(No to Land Grab, Japan 2016: 6). As the political and 
economic context continues to deteriorate, there is a 
risk that those opposing exclusionary development 
processes in the Nacala Corridor will find themselves 
facing further “tremendous pains”. At the same time, as 
the scale of ambition of ProSAVANA has diminished, and 
Brazil’s engagement has become much less central to a 
corridor development process increasingly driven by 
bilateral Japan-Mozambique dynamics, it has proved a 
much greater challenge to keep energised the multi-level 
connections of the ‘No to ProSAVANA’ movement. It 
remains to be seen whether civil society groups at the 
local, regional, national and international levels can find 
new ways of maintaining solidarity and deploying 
effective collective action without the powerfully 
symbolic focus for transnational contestation that Brazil’s 
initial highly visible role in ProSAVANA provided. 
End Notes
1  For the full collection of World Development articles 
produced by the ‘China and Brazil in African 
Agriculture’
2  Japanese actors – ranging from the cooperation 
agency JICA to corporations such as Mitsui to NGOs 
such as the Japan International Volunteer Centre 
– have played an extremely important role in 
shaping both the design and the contestation of 
ProSAVANA, but this role lies outside the scope of 
this paper; for an important initial analysis, see 
Funada-Classen 2013a, and for a comprehensive 
recent overview, see No to Landgrab, Japan 2016.
 3  On the More Food programme see Mukwereza 
(2015) and Cabral et al. (2016). 
4   Interview with CAMPO agronomist, Nampula, 5 
April 2013.
5   Tim Wise, who visited the Nacala Corridor in search 
of the ‘biggest land-grab in Africa’ a few months 
after our initial fieldwork, arrived at a similar 
conclusion (Wise 2014).
6  ‘Onde a soja der, o gaúcho planta’ (interview with 
CAMPO agronomist, Nampula, 5 April 2013). 
Gaúcho is a colloquial term for someone from the 
state of Rio Grande do Sul, used in this context to 
refer to the southern Brazilian farmers who have 
taken soybeans across the central Cerrado belt and 
into the north of the country.
7  For the history of the UGC and its initial association 
with Frelimo’s ‘Dynamizing Groups’ see Cruz e Silva 
(2007).
 8 Interview with Ismael Ossemane, 21 January 2014.
 9 For a brief description of the land campaign see 
Negrão (1999), Hanlon (2002) and Kanji et al. (2002).
10 Interview with Luís Muchanga, 11 February 2014.
11 Carlos Milani, pers. comm. 14 May 2015.
12 See https://adecru.wordpress.com/2016/03/08/
denuncia-da-parceria-entre-a-wwf-e-o-
prosavana/.
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13 See Chichava 2016 for a discussion of these tensions.
14 See http://www.pambazuka.org/pt/land-
environment/moçambique-campanha-
“não-ao-prosavana”-considera-fraudulento-o-
processo-de.
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